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Abstract 
We live an environment where access to material goods is cheap, objects are easy to obtain, and 
we have an ever-increasing number of options to choose from. The field of decision science has 
advanced with this pattern, providing a greater breadth and depth of research on how and why 
people make decisions about material goods. However, our pervading desire to acquire things 
that we do not need and our failure to reallocate goods and money that may be better used by 
others (e.g., charities) are understudied. This dissertation investigates these processes, the factors 
that influence our underlying desire to acquire and our disinclination to discard the things that we 
do not need, using an appraisal framework.  
 
Three chapters investigate how psychological appraisal patterns, affective disorders, and neural 
indicators are related to resource allocation. In Chapter 2, we manipulated emotions and 
appraisal dimensions that have previously been associated with acquisitiveness and found that 
uncertain appraisals were associated with an increased drive to acquire objects. In Chapter 3, we 
investigated how chronic emotions are associated with acquisition and found that the 
combination of depression and anxiety, a high-uncertainty state, was associated with increased 
acquisition of objects generally, and especially less useful objects that people with hoarding 
disorders prefer. Chapter 4 investigated factors that influence when people will reallocate their 
own monetary resources to another at a cost to themselves. We found that vulnerability, high 
arousal/activation, and their combination led to increased donations to charitable causes. These 
causes were also differentially associated with brain areas that have previously been associated 
  xi 
with charitable donations (e.g., dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, striatum) and motor-motivational 
regions that have not been hypothesized by prior models (e.g., premotor area, supplementary 
motor area).  
 
Together, these studies begin to determine the factors that influence resource allocation 
decisions, including both the acquisition and discarding of resources. Our approach is also one of 
the first to explore interactions between emotions and appraisal dimensions that tend to be 
overlooked in the literature but may lead to unpredicted effects and open avenues to continued 
scholarship in the decision and affective sciences.  
  1 
Chapter 1: General Introduction 
 
Consumption is directly linked to environmental problems, but little research addresses 
the human side of the problem—our pervading desire to acquire, store, and consume energy and 
resources, even to our detriment. Even when there is a worldwide recession, people still take on 
debt to fund lifestyles they cannot afford or sustain. In an economically rational world we would 
stay within our means and take into consideration all the factors involved in our resource 
allocation decisions, including the impact on the environment. These resource allocation 
decisions take many forms, from the desire to acquire objects and money to the desire to donate 
money and objects to others in need.  
This dissertation presents studies that investigate how the affective and decision sciences 
inform our understanding of resource allocation decisions. Resource allocation, as used in this 
dissertation, is meant broadly with regard to how people invest their time, money, and energy. 
All of the studies in this dissertation investigate how individual level variables shape the value of 
options and people’s eventual decisions. Chapters 2 and 3 assess how transient and chronic 
affective states influence people’s drive to acquire and keep objects, and demonstrate that 
uncertain affective states are associated with increased acquisitiveness. However, we also find 
that when sadness is added to uncertain states it decreases consumption. Chapter 4 investigates 
how the degree to which we prime action-based concepts and motor-motivational neural circuitry 
leads to increases in donation behavior, another type of resource allocation. This work finds that 
charities that elicit more positive feelings of warmth and sympathy lead to higher donations, and 
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that activating motor-motivational neural systems especially increases donations to these types of 
charities. Before discussing these studies in more detail, I will give a brief background on the 
literature motivating these studies.  
 
Decision Making and Preference Construction 
Early economic theories of decision making stated that the value or utility that people 
place on different options is static and unchangeable (Fishburn, 1970; Friedman & Savage, 
1948), allowing for strong predictions about stable preferences in consumption patterns. 
According to these models, suppose A > B denotes that A is preferred to B. Then if an individual 
prefers A > B, and B > C, then they necessarily prefer A > C. This makes sense with easily 
exchangeable formats such as money. A person who prefers $100 > $50, and $50 > $10 should 
always prefer $100 > $10. These theories hypothesize that preferences are consistent across 
domains and invariant to response formats and framing.  
However, in the 1980s and 1990s, researchers testing the stability and structure of 
people’s preferences found that there were inconsistencies that violated almost all theories of 
preference, including expected utility theory. In these experiments people were offered a choice 
between a gamble with a high chance of winning a low amount of money (P bet) or a low chance 
of winning a high amount of money ($ bet). People typically prefer the P bet in a forced choice 
(i.e., choose P bet or $ bet) but bid a higher amount of money to obtain the $ bet compared to the 
P bet. This is what is referred to as a preference reversal, when preferences for options are 
flipped after a contextual, response (e.g., P or $ bet), or other change that does not influence 
objective characteristics of the options. A preference reversal occurred here because people 
preferred  
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(P bet) > ($ bet) with one response format, forced choice, and preferred ($ bet) > (P bet) in 
another response format, bidding, even though their expected values remained unchanged. These 
refutations of the traditional decision framework have led to the current consensus in the field 
that values are constructed on the spot per the existing context rather than fixed and invariant 
across contexts. Similar to the shift in the valuation of options depending on the response format, 
emotions can alter preferences (e.g., Raghunathan, Pham, & Corfman, 2006) and the values of 
options (e.g., Cryder, Lerner, Gross, & Dahl, 2008; Lerner, Li, & Weber, 2012).  
Moving from a normative analysis specifying what people should do to a descriptive 
analysis specifying what people actually do, extant research has shown additional deviations in 
how people make decisions under uncertainty. First, probability information is not evaluated 
objectively but is evaluated on a subjective basis (Kahneman, 1979). When given choices 
between gambles, people overweight small likelihoods of events occurring and underweight high 
likelihoods of events occurring. Second, people do not treat gains and losses of the same 
objective magnitude in the same way. Losses have a greater impact on utility, meaning that the 
positive impact of $10 has about the same absolute utility as a loss $5. This is sometimes 
described by the saying, “losses loom larger than gains,” and is important to keep in mind in the 
following discussion of affect and decision making. 
 
Affect and Appraisals 
Most theories of emotion acknowledge that emotions arise in response to cognitive 
evaluations of events that signal information about the self, and interactions between the self and 
the environment (Ekman & Davidson, 1994; Frijda, 1993; Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, Schorr, & 
Johnstone, 2001). Through signaling important and relevant information, emotions help 
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individuals navigate the physical and social environment. Functionally, emotions direct attention 
and shift cognitive and physiological resources quickly from one task to another. Simon (1967) 
describes emotions as cognitive “interrupts” that suppress ongoing actions in lieu of high-
priority, emotion-relevant actions. Emotions also organize sets of responses that facilitate 
adaptive responding (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987), such as disgust helping individuals avoid 
objects that could lead to illness or harm (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Nesse, 1990; Nesse & 
Ellsworth, 2009). 
The exact cognitive processing of these appraisals vary, with some being relatively 
automatic and happening quickly, and others taking more cognitive resources and occurring 
later. For example, judgments of valence (i.e., is this good or bad?) happen relatively 
automatically and quickly while judgments of control (i.e., what can I do?) take significantly 
more time and cognitive resources (Gentsch, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2013).  
The above two appraisal dimensions, valence and control, are two of approximately six 
major appraisal dimensions. In a recent, worldwide study that examined multiple affective 
indicators of emotions (Fontaine, Scherer, Roesch, & Ellsworth, 2007), support for four major 
appraisal dimensions was found. These dimensions included pleasantness (i.e., the degree that 
one feels pleasure versus displeasure), certainty (i.e., the degree to which future events seem 
predictable and comprehensible versus unpredictable and incomprehensible), control (i.e., the 
degree to which events seem brought about by individuals versus the situation), and 
arousal/activation (i.e., the degree to which physical or bodily arousal is activated; though other 
dimensions are discussed in Frijda, 1993; Roseman, 1991; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  
In appraisal frameworks, different emotions are classified by existing at different points 
on these appraisal dimensions. For example, one study had subjects recall experiences of 16 
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different emotions and rate those experiences across a number of dimensions (Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985). This study was able to characterize different emotions across the appraisal 
dimensions. They found that fear was associated with feelings of unpleasantness, uncertainty, 
and low self-responsibility. On the other hand, anger was associated with feelings of 
unpleasantness, certainty, and low self-responsibility. Importantly, while fear and anger are 
similar on some dimensions (unpleasantness, low self-responsibility), fear is associated with a 
sense of uncertainty whereas anger is associated with a sense of certainty.  
 
Affect and Decision Making 
Recently there has been a rise in studies exploring the connection between emotions and 
decision making (see Figure 1.1, taken from Lerner et al., 2015). It is important to first describe 
the differences between (a) integral compared to incidental emotion, (b) valenced accounts of 
emotions on decision making, and then (c) the appraisal approach to explaining how emotions 
influence decision making.  
Figure 1.1. Number of scholarly publications from 1970 to 2013 that refer to 
“emotion(s)/affect/mood and decision making” (green bars) and proportion of all scholarly 
publications referring to “decision making” that this number represents (blue line). Taken 
directly from Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam (2015). 
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Integral Emotions and Decision Making 
Integral emotions refer to emotions that are related to the decision at hand. For example, 
imagine that you are walking home and trying to decide whether to take a shortcut through an 
alley. As you look down the alley, you see that most of the lights are out and notice the silhouette 
of a person in the darkness, filling you with anxiety and a sense of danger. The anxiety is integral 
to the decision because it pertains to the decision at hand; your evaluation of the alley is causing 
negative feelings that suggest that the alley is unsafe and that you should not proceed. For the 
most part, theories of integral emotions have focused on risk assessments and decision making. 
Two of the most influential theories of integral emotions are the Somatic Marker 
Hypothesis (SMH; Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997) and 
Risk as Feelings theory (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001). The SMH proposes that 
valenced affective “markers” are attached to stimuli and outcomes that indicate whether they are 
beneficial or harmful to the self. Evidence for the SMH comes largely from studies of the Iowa 
Gambling Task (IGT), where subjects make decisions between four decks of cards. Subjects are 
given a fixed amount of money to begin the task and each card that they choose results in earning 
or losing money. Two of the decks result in long-run losses and two other decks result in long-
run gains. In the initial study (Bechara et al., 1997), subjects began to make advantageous 
decisions about which deck to choose from before they could articulate why they were choosing 
from that deck, and this was accompanied by activation of the sympathetic nervous system (as 
measured by skin conductance responses; SCRs). A number of studies have been published on 
this work since then (reviewed in Bechara & Damasio, 2005), including specifying the 
underlying neural substrates of the process. 
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Lesion studies, where subjects with focal lesions to parts of their brain are selected to 
participate, have differentiated the neural substrates underlying the creation of these somatic 
markers and their integration into the decision process. The amygdala is necessary for the 
production of somatic markers, since lesions to the amygdala lead to a cessation of SCRs 
(Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2006). Lesions of the ventral medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) 
and the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), on the other hand, are associated with subjects producing 
skin conductance responses but failing to decide advantageously in the IGT (Bechara, Tranel, & 
Damasio, 2000). This has led the authors to conclude that the amygdala is necessary for the 
production of somatic markers and that the vmPFC/OFC are necessary for the integration of 
these signals into the decision process.  
The Risk as Feelings hypothesis (Loewenstein et al., 2001) is not a neuroscientific theory, 
but focuses on how affect can inform decision theory. The main point of their argument is that 
risk assessments are not done through cold, cognitive calculation and evaluated using overall 
measures such as expected value. Instead, evaluations of risk operate through parallel routes, one 
being cognitive and more rational and the other being emotional and more implicit. Importantly, 
when these two streams diverge, Risk as Feelings suggests that greater weight is placed on the 
affective input. For example, people with phobias of flying know that the objective risk of harm 
when flying on a plane are extremely low, nevertheless they are unwilling to board a plane 
without clinical interventions (Laker, 2013). This is because some calculations are done 
differently by the cognitive and affective systems: the cognitive system weights probabilities 
relatively objectively while the affective system weights probabilities by the vividness of 
outcomes and is relatively insensitive to objective probabilities.  
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Incidental Emotions and Decision Making 
In contrast to integral effects of emotions on decision making, incidental effects occur 
when emotions that are unrelated to the decision at hand systematically influence or bias the 
decision making process. Recall the example where you are walking home and trying to decide 
whether to take a shortcut through an alley. If your doctor called you earlier for an immediate 
appointment and this is making you anxious about your health, then the anxiety could carryover 
and lead you to avoid the shortcut through the alley, just like integral anxiety did. Incidental 
emotions are thought to produce the same effects as integral emotions, though differences 
between the two are rarely investigated. 
 
General Theories of Carryover Effects 
Feelings-as-Information theory (Schwarz, 2012; Schwarz & Clore, 1983) takes a 
valenced approach to explaining emotion carryover effects, including incidental effects. 
Feelings-as-Information theory argues that when people are making decisions and assessments, 
they incorporate how they feel about outcomes into the decision process. So when people are 
making choices about objects they ask things like, “How does this object make me feel (i.e., 
pleasure or displeasure)?” When making evaluations of individuals they ask, “Do I like this 
person or dislike this person?” This model accounts for incidental carryover effects depending on 
where feelings are attributed. If people do not attribute their mood to something else then they 
can misattribute that affect toward unrelated judgments. As an early test of this theory, 
participants who were called on sunny days and were presumably in a positive mood reported 
higher life-satisfaction than participants who were called on rainy days and were presumably in a 
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more negative mood. However, by slightly tweaking the procedure and asking participants about 
the weather before asking about their life-satisfaction, causing them to attribute their positive or 
negative feelings to the weather, this effect completely disappeared (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). In 
other words, affect only carried over to evaluations of life-satisfaction when people did not think 
about their affect as due to the weather.  
The Feelings-as-Information theory accounts for a great deal of emotional carryover 
effects, but cannot account for effects within the same valence. The Appraisal Tendency 
Framework (ATF; Han, Lerner, & Keltner, 2007; Lerner, Han, & Keltner, 2007; Lerner, 2000) 
builds upon appraisal theories of emotion in order to link emotions to specific decision making 
effects. According to appraisal theories, people feel emotions because they appraise situations 
using the appraisal dimensions, such as appraisals of anger being derived from negative events 
that are perceived to be predictable and caused by others. The ATF proposes that when people 
are feeling emotions they are pre-disposed to appraise new events and situations with the central 
appraisal dimensions triggered by the felt emotion(s) (Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2015). 
So, when people are angry they are more likely to appraise new negative events as being 
predictable and caused by others. Indeed, this is the case. 
Numerous studies have drawn upon the ATF and shown varying effects from emotions of 
the same valence, as well as similar effects from emotions of the opposite valence. When angry 
(a human-agency emotion), people expect ambiguous events to be caused by other individuals 
compared to when sad (a situational-agency emotion), where people expect ambiguous events to 
be caused by the situation (Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993). Similarly, inducing people 
into a state of anger results in more optimistic risk judgments than those generated by people in a 
fearful state (Lerner, 2001). This study also found that appraisals of control fully mediated the 
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link between emotion state and risk estimates, supporting the causal pathway proposed by the 
ATF. The ATF is the general framework drawn upon in this dissertation.  
 Table 1.1. Definitions of common emotion terms. 
Term Definition 
Affect Unspecified feelings, or the overarching term for 
constructs involving emotion, moods, and emotion-
related constructs 
Valence The negative or positive value/pleasantness of an 
affective state 
Emotion Affective responses to specific events that are usually 
shorter in duration than moods, and are associated with 
specific cognitive appraisals 
Mood Affective responses to unspecified events that are longer 
in duration than emotions and more diffuse 
Integral emotion Feelings that are associated with a current decision at 
hand  
Incidental emotion Feelings that are associated with events unrelated to the 
current decision at hand; may unknowingly influence the 
current decision 
Appraisal Process that detects and assesses the significance of the 
environment for well-being 
Appraisal theme Summary of specific harms/benefits that may arise in the 
environment, which influences coping behaviors 
Appraisal tendency Process by which an individual uses their current 
appraisal state (i.e., place on each appraisal dimension) to 
appraise new situations in similar ways  
 
The Current Research 
Resource allocation is primarily composed of two types of decisions: Decisions to 
acquire or accumulate, and decisions to discard or expel. It could be argued that decisions to 
keep objects are another type of resource allocation decision, but this framing runs into certain 
problems. Once resources are acquired, action is not typically required in order for them to be 
retained, but action is typically required in order for resources to be discarded. In this sense, 
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retention of objects will be treated as failure to discard rather than as a separate process. 
Importantly, failure to discard can reflect a dislike or inability to get rid of an object (e.g., fear of 
not having it when necessary) or satisfaction and positive feelings toward owning an object. 
Current research suggests that acquisition and discard decisions are separable and 
associated with different underlying cognitive, affective, and neural processes. Compulsive 
spending is associated with the inability to control impulses to spend, but not with an inability to 
discard or get rid of things that are currently owned (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Neuroimaging work has shown a double dissociation, with acquisition decisions activating the 
OFC more than discard decisions, but discard decisions activating the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex more than acquisition decisions (Wang, Seidler, Hall, & Preston, 2012). It is possible to 
spend a whole career researching either of these processes, and this dissertation only begins to 
investigate the dynamics of acquisition and discard processes. 
The work conducted in this dissertation is motivated by work with Dr. Stephanie Preston, 
and touches upon both acquisition and discard decisions. Chapters 2 and 3 investigate acquisition 
behaviors while Chapter 4 investigates discard behaviors. Chapter 2 applies the ATF to 
acquisition decisions to explore how certainty is associated with the acquisition of objects. This 
work uses an emotion induction paradigm to make participants feel anxiety, a low certainty 
emotion, or sadness, an emotion typically high in certainty. The experimental manipulation of 
emotions allows us to directly observe whether increases in either emotion lead to increases in 
the amount of objects that subjects are driven to acquire. Results indicated that people induced to 
uncertain affective states acquired more objects than sad or neutral people, and paid more for 
useful objects than pleasurable objects. We also found that people who only felt uncertainty 
accumulated more objects, but people who felt both uncertainty and sadness acquired fewer 
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objects. This suggests that when uncertainty and sadness are combined then appraisals of 
certainty associated with sadness may blunt the effects of uncertainty (Winterich, Han, & Lerner, 
2010), or that combined uncertainty and sadness may lead to an emergent affective state 
unrelated to shifts on appraisal dimensions (Kreibig, Samson, & Gross, 2013). 
Chapter 3 investigated whether similar results were apparent in individuals with chronic 
affective disorders. This study used a large-scale survey across people with a variety of chronic 
affective disorders to assess the types of objects that people were motivated to acquire and keep. 
Packrats, people with the highest chronic drives to acquire and retain goods, were especially 
interested in low-value items that could be repurposed, reused, or given to others when they need 
them, as well as social items used in the home. Participants with affective disorders were 
generally disinclined to acquire objects compared to controls, especially memorabilia. We also 
examined more natural affect in patients suffering from psychiatric conditions by clustering them 
using scales assessing cognitive and affective individual differences. This approach showed that 
subjects feeling combined anxiety and depression were disinclined to acquire the scrap items 
packrats were drawn toward, an effect similar to the decreased acquisition of subjects feeling 
uncertain and sad in Chapter 2. 
Instead of investigating acquisition decisions like we did in Chapters 2 and 3, in Chapter 
4 we investigated how people make decisions to donate monetary resources. Participants viewed 
numerous charities and made decisions to allocate monetary resources by donating any amount 
of their earned money to these charities. We varied the types of emotions elicited by the charities 
(e.g., less or more nurturant, warm, compassionate feelings) and the level of action that was 
required to help (e.g., passive or active helping activities). Charities that elicited more warm, 
compassionate feelings received higher donations from participants, and these more nurturant 
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charities received an extra donation boost as they elicited higher arousal appraisals. The more 
nurturant charities eliciting high arousal also activated a network of brain regions identified in 
previous studies of charitable donations, including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, striatum, 
and premotor areas.  
Taken together, these chapters demonstrate that affective factors influence both resource 
allocation decisions to acquire as well as to retain and discard resources. This dissertation 
showcases a variety of approaches to understanding affective influences on resource allocation 
decisions, including affect manipulation, affect measurement, and the use of ecological 
clustering on affective factors. Beyond demonstrating that affect influences resource allocation 
decisions, this work also suggests that interactions between appraisal dimensions may produce 
unpredicted effects (Chapters 2 and 3) that do not fit into existing frameworks for understanding 
emotions and decision making. This dissertation demonstrates that emotions and appraisal 
dimensions—like sadness, anxiety, and uncertainty—can interact in unexpected ways that 
require new theories (e.g., tests of emotional blunting versus unique mixed affective states, 
Kreibig et al., 2013; Winterich et al., 2010), to allow us to better prescribe decision making 
strategies and decision aids for sustainability, finance, and well-being.   
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Chapter 2: Affective Influences on the Drive to Acquire: Uncertainty and Sadness Increase 
Consumption, but Uncertain-Sadness Does Not 
 
Abstract 
Current research is rapidly discovering ways in which emotions influence people’s 
preferences and willingness to pay, but there is no work investigating its influence on people’s 
overall drive to acquire and consume. Uncertainty about the future is associated with many 
problems of acquisition and consumption including hoarding disorder, increased eating in 
dieters, and even increased stockpiling in hoarding mammals. Due to these links, we 
hypothesized that uncertainty would cause people to acquire an increased quantity of objects in 
order to cope with uncertain future threats. To investigate this possibility we induced emotions 
varying in their level of uncertainty and measured subjects’ acquisition patterns on a 
computerized object decision making task. In two studies we found that high uncertainty states 
including anxiety (Study 1) and an uncertain form of sadness (Study 2) led subjects to acquire an 
increased quantity of objects compared to subjects feeling more certain forms of sadness. These 
effects persisted in spite of emotions not influencing evaluations of anticipated pleasure or 
perceived usefulness of the items.  
Keywords: Emotion, decision making, uncertainty, anxiety, sadness, consumption 
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Introduction 
Acquisitiveness, the drive to acquire and consume objects, varies continuously within the 
population (Timpano et al., 2012; Vickers & Preston, 2014) but has been neglected in the 
decision making literature. Our purchasing and ownership has led to a 100-fold increase in the 
required storage space of Americans since the 1980s (Drentea, 2000; Self Storage Association of 
America, 2013), but it is unlikely that anything in the past 30 years has made us need these extra 
things. To help people spend within their means, avoid unnecessary debt and stresses, and 
decrease our impact on the environment, we need to understand how acquisitiveness functions.  
Recent research on emotions and consumption decisions has focused on preference shifts 
and willingness to pay (WTP), but not the underlying drive to acquire and consume generally. 
Research suggests that emotions associated with acquisition and cost are dissociable. Emotions 
associated with acquisition tend to be positive (e.g., thinking about getting a great dinner) whole 
emotions associated with costs tend to be negative (e.g., thinking about not being able to buy a 
new phone) (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1998; Rick, Cryder, & Loewenstein, 2008). Therefore, while 
emotions that lead to increased WTP may lead to similar effects on the drive to acquire, it is not 
necessarily the case.  
More strong evidence of a dissociation between anticipatory emotions and payment 
computations comes from a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study (Knutson, 
Rick, Wimmer, Prelec, & Loewenstein, 2007). When subjects are given choices to purchase or 
not purchase products while in the scanner, different neural circuits are involved in the initial 
valuation of objects, and separate neural circuits come online to incorporate pricing and come to 
a final decision. Product preferences prior to pricing information activated reward-related 
circuitry (the nucleus accumbens), but decisions to purchase moderated activation of the mesial 
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prefrontal cortex, an area associated with higher-level cognitive computations and the integration 
of value signals from multiple areas of the brain (Chib, Rangel, Shimojo, & O'Doherty, 2009; 
Plassmann, O'Doherty, & Rangel, 2007). Thus, evaluation and payment calculations are 
dissociable. The present studies aimed to understand the ways that emotions influence people’s 
acquisitiveness and WTP, beginning with uncertainty due to its documented associations with 
consumption.  
In the literature, anxiety, a high uncertainty emotion, and sadness, a high certainty 
emotion, have both been implicated in the human drive to consume. Both transient states of 
anxiety (Lerner, 2001) and having an anxious personality (Schaninger, 1976) lead to increased 
perceptions of risks and uncertainty in the environment, perceptions that are associated with 
increased acquisition in individuals with hoarding disorder (Steketee & Frost, 2003; Steketee, 
Frost, & Kyrios, 2003). Hoarding disorder has a high comorbidity with anxiety disorders (Frost, 
Steketee, & Tolin, 2011), and surveys of hoarding symptoms correlate with higher intolerance of 
uncertainty (Holaway, Heimberg, & Coles, 2006). In related work in animals, hoarding 
mammals gather and retain larger hoards in more uncertain, more variable environments (e.g., 
high latitudes; Preston & Jacobs, 2001, 2005; Vander Wall, 1990). One study also found that 
anxiety increased preferences for more useful objects (Raghunathan et al., 2006). These studies 
lead to the hypothesis that uncertain individuals should acquire more objects overall, and that 
this increased acquisition may be focused on useful objects.  
Sadness, on the other hand, is typically associated with certainty (Fontaine et al., 2007; 
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), but can increase reward motivations and consumption. Inducing 
sadness in people leads to preferences for rewarding social contact over instrumental social 
contact (Forgas, 1991); causes people to eat more palatable, hedonic foods compared to happy 
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subjects (Garg, Wansink, & Inman, 2007); and causes people to prefer more comfortable, 
rewarding products (Raghunathan et al., 2006). Additionally, sadness increases participants’ 
WTP (Cryder et al., 2008), though this only affected self-focused individuals. Many of these 
authors have suggested a mood-maintenance hypothesis, that sadness motivates people to put 
themselves into a better mood, and that this can be accomplished by social interaction or by 
acquisition of objects. A direct link between the motivation to boost mood and purchasing comes 
from retail therapy, the proclivity to purchase planned or unplanned “treats” for mood-
improvement (Atalay & Meloy, 2011). None of these studies have suggested an increase in 
overall rates of acquisition, and since a single mood-improving treat may be enough to boost 
people’s affective state we did not hypothesize that sadness would increase overall 
acquisitiveness. However, the mood-boosting hypothesis suggests that a disproportionate number 
of the total acquired objects would have more hedonic qualities that might put people into a 
better mood. 
We created three item categories to test our hypotheses. We created a set of “functional” 
items high in usefulness to test the hypothesis that uncertain emotions would lead people to 
disproportionately prefer them. Another set of “hedonic” items high in desirable, pleasurable 
qualities were created to test the hypothesis that sadness would lead people to disproportionately 
prefer them in order to improve their mood. Since functional and hedonic items contained 
tradeoffs on the other dimension, neither were objectively superior (i.e., better on both useful and 
hedonic qualities). In naturalistic settings, the “best” items that could potentially lead to the 
greatest positive impacts on people’s mood would be superior on both attributes. To better 
approximate this superior category of objects we included objects that were high on both 
usefulness and pleasurable qualities, hereafter referred to as “premium” items. 
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In Study 1, participants were induced into an uncertain (anxious), certain (sad), or neutral 
emotional state by reading and empathizing with a story. Participants then performed a 
computerized object decision task (ODT; Preston, Muroff, & Wengrovitz, 2009) where they 
were told that they could receive items that they selected in the task. We found that uncertainty 
increased the quantity of objects acquired by subjects, but certainty did not influence the level of 
objects that subjects acquired. Since sadness can vary from uncertain to certain, in Study 2 we 
sought to ascertain whether sadness could lead to increased consumption if it were accompanied 
by more uncertain appraisals. Subjects were induced into an uncertain-sadness, certain-sadness, 
or neutral state before measuring acquisition on the ODT. Even when all emotional subjects read 
a sad story, uncertainty increased overall consumption. The effect of uncertainty increasing 
consumption was moderated by an unexpected interaction: uncertainty only increased 
consumption for subjects who reported low levels of sadness.  
Study 1 
Methods 
Participants. One hundred ten (110; mean age = 19.21 years, SD = 1.51; N = 50 females) 
University of Michigan undergraduates and people from the local community participated in the 
study, and were compensated with introductory psychology course credit or $10 for their time, 
respectively. The total duration of the study was approximately one hour. Six subjects were 
removed from analysis: three due to computer errors, two due to reporting they did not feel the 
emotions in the story during a post-task interview, and one that did not follow instructions.  
Procedure 
Upon entry to the lab, subjects were told a cover story that multiple researchers had 
combined two separate studies to fit into the one hour of testing time. The first was purported to 
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examine responses while empathizing with stories. Subjects then went through an emotion 
induction and were re-consented for a study investigating object preferences. They then 
performed the ODT, filled out personality questionnaires, and were debriefed. 
Emotion induction. To induce a specific emotion, subjects were randomized into one of 
three emotion conditions (anxiety, sadness, or a neutral state). Emotions were manipulated by 
having subjects read stories that were approximately one page in length. Subjects were instructed 
to mentally step into the shoes of the main character in the story and imagine the situation as 
vividly as possible, as if the story were happening to them. Stories were adapted from 
Raghunathan et al. (2006). Sad subjects (mean age = 19.25, SD = 1.27, N = 37, 18 females) read 
a story about the death of their mother, anxious subjects (mean age = 18.81, SD = 0.89, N = 37, 
16 females) read about being called by their doctor to discuss an unnamed health problem, and 
neutral subjects (mean age = 19.63, SD = 2.18, N = 33, 14 females) read about performing daily 
activities such as brushing their teeth and riding the bus. Subjects were given five minutes to 
empathize. To measure subjective differences in emotion, subjects rated 28 emotion adjectives 
(adapted from the PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Telegren, 1988) both before empathizing with the 
stories and immediately following the empathy task on a scale ranging from (1) “Not at all” to 
(5) “Extremely.” To ensure that the empathy task induced the desired emotions, we used 
composite scores created with three items per emotion (as in ` Cryder et al., 2008; Raghunathan 
et al., 2006). Sadness composite scores were computed by averaging the ratings of “blue,” “sad,” 
and “depressed;” anxiety was scored as the average of “anxious,” “nervous,” and “worried;” and 
neutral scores were created using the adjectives “indifferent,” “neutral,” and “unemotional.” 
None of these terms appeared in any of the empathy stories. 
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In order to increase the credibility of the cover story that the empathizing task was a 
stand-alone study that was unrelated to the ODT, subjects also filled out a face valid five item 
“Empathy Questionnaire" that we created. Items assessed whether they could relate to the story 
and how easy it was to empathize with the situation (e.g., “I felt myself getting emotional as I 
read the passage,” and, “I was able to step into the shoes of the main character”). 
Object decision task. Following the emotion induction procedure, subjects were told that 
the researcher conducting the second study was interested in decision making about objects. All 
subjects were re-consented and given instructions for a one-block version of the ODT (Preston et 
al., 2009). Subjects saw a variety of objects and were instructed to imagine that they were being 
offered to them for free on their testing day. Their task for each object was to respond “acquire” 
if they would keep the hypothetical item for free, or respond “do not acquire” if they would not 
take that object home for free. This procedure was used to measure acquisitiveness without 
confounds associated with price. Items remained on the screen until subjects made a response, 
and there was an ITI of 3 seconds. To help elicit subjects’ true acquisition behaviors, we 
informed subjects that we were having a raffle where 10 items that people said they would 
acquire would really be given to participants for free. After a practice round with 6 unrelated 
items, subjects continued to the full block of items.  
ODT item selection. Selection of object stimuli for the ODT was based on objects’ 
functional and hedonic attributes. Functional, hedonic, and premium item categories each 
consisted of 16 items, eight of which were foods and eight were non-foods, for a total of 48 trials 
per subject for analysis (see Table 2.2 for a full list and ratings, described below). 
Item ratings. After subjects performed the ODT they rated multiple dimensions of each 
item. For the first two dimensions, they rated how hedonic (e.g., pleasurable to have/consume it; 
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think obtaining it would make them happy) and useful (e.g., would come in handy; could be used 
in many situations) each item was. Additionally, we recorded how much subjects thought the 
items would cost in a store, and how much they would be willing to pay if the item was available 
for their purchase on the day of testing.  
Personality questionnaires. Before debriefing, subjects also filled out questionnaires 
about how hungry they were (Friedman, Ulrich, & Mattes, 1999); the savings inventory, revised, 
which measures the degree of overacquisition, failure to discard, and clutter as symptoms of 
problematic hoarding behaviors (Frost, Steketee, & Grisham, 2004); the obsessive compulsive 
inventory, revised (Foa et al., 2002), which measures multiple dimensions of obsessive 
compulsive disorder including hoarding symptoms; and the Beck depression inventory II (Beck, 
Steer, & Brown, 1996), which measures the degree that subjects are currently experiencing 
depressive symptoms. None of these surveys interacted with group responses so they are not 
discussed below. 
Analysis 
Manipulation checks were conducted using repeated-measures ANOVAs. Changes in 
composite emotion scores (post- minus pre-emotion induction) were used as the dependent 
variables with story type (anxious, sad, neutral) as a between-subject factor. Item validation was 
conducted using an ANOVA with averaged ratings on how hedonic and useful each object was, 
with object category (functional, hedonic, premium) entered as the grouping factor.  
Performance on the ODT was analyzed using the percentage of the total items in each 
category acquired as the dependent variable. Differences in acquisition, WTP, and item ratings 
were estimated using a mixed ANOVA with emotion group (anxious, sad, and neutral) as a 
between-subject factor, and within-subjects factors for item type (functional, hedonic, premium) 
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and whether items were consumable (non-foods, foods). All post-hoc tests were corrected with 
Tukey’s Honestly Significant Differences. The alpha threshold for significance was set at .05.  
Results 
Manipulation check. The omnibus test on composite emotion change scores revealed a 
significant difference in emotions across groups due to the anxious group increasing in anxiety 
compared to the neutral group, and the sad group increasing in sadness compared to the neutral 
group, omnibus: F(4,172) = 10.09, p < .001; all contrast p’s < .05).  
Item validation. Our a priori item categories (functional, hedonic, and premium) 
differed in how hedonic and useful they were, omnibus: F(2,45) = 56.43, p < .001. Confirming 
our characterization of these categories, post-hoc tests showed that hedonic and premium items 
were more hedonic than the functional items. Also, functional and premium items were more 
useful than hedonic items, all p’s < .01. Premium items did not differ from hedonic items on the 
hedonic scale, nor did premium items differ from functional items on the usefulness scale, as 
desired. Item types did not differ on perceived price, ruling out the explanation that any item 
category was taken only because it was perceived as more expensive, omnibus: F(2,45) = 0.10, 
ns. 
Object Decision Task. In line with our hypothesis, anxious subjects took more items 
overall, main effect of emotion group: F(2,103) = 4.50, p = .013. Post-hoc tests showed anxious 
subjects took more than sad and neutral subjects, but sad subject did not take more than neutral 
subjects, Manxious-sad = 11.91, p = .020; Manxious-neutral = 10.89, p = .044; Msad-neutral = -1.02, p = .98. 
The interaction between emotion group and item type was not significant, item type by emotion 
group interaction: F(4,206) = 1.29, p = .27, but repeated-measures ANOVAs across the three 
groups within each item type found that anxious subjects took more items with functional 
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attributes (functional and premium items, but not hedonic items) than the other two groups, 
emotion group main effect in Functional items: F(2,103) = 4.72, p = .011, ηp2 = 0.084; emotion 
group main effect in Premium items: F(2,103) = 4.70, p = .011, ηp2 = 0.084; emotion group main 
effect in Hedonic items: F(2,103) = 1.29, p = .279; ηp2 = 0.024). Mean rates of acquisition are 
listed in Table 2.1. 
Item types differed in how often they were acquired by subjects, item type omnibus: 
F(2,206) = 94.16, p < .001. Premium items were acquired most, hedonic items a moderate 
amount, and functional items least, post-hoc p’s < .001.  
Table 2.1. Percentage of items taken (standard error) split by group and item type. 
  Item Type 
Group Overall Functional Hedonic Premium 
Sad 37% (2.96%) 24% (3.23%) 41% (3.87%) 45% (3.69%) 
Anxious 50% (3.66%) 37% (4.95%) 50% (4.04%) 63% (3.95%) 
Neutral 38% (3.68%) 22% (3.74%) 22% (4.54%) 53% (4.65%) 
 
Willingness to pay. There were no overall differences in WTP between groups, but there 
was a marginal interaction between group and item type, main effect of group: F(2,103) = 0.25, p 
= .783; group by item type interaction: F(4,206) = 2.08, p = .085. Within each group, we ran 
pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni corrections (adjustment denoted padj) and found that 
anxious and sad subjects were willing to pay higher prices for premium than hedonic items 
(anxious: padj > .018; sad: padj > .009). However, only anxious subjects were willing to pay more 
for functional than hedonic items (anxious: padj = .027, sad and neutral: psadj > .99). Uniquely, 
sad subjects had marginally higher WTP for premium over functional items (padj > .054). The 
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neutral group showed no pairwise differences. There were no group differences in each item type 
separately, and no other group interactions in the model reached significance, ps > .275.  
Similar to the acquisition analysis, WTP was higher for premium items than functional 
items, F(2,206) = 18.87, p < .001. WTP for hedonic items did not differ from either of the other 
two item types, p > .25. WTP was also higher for non-foods than foods, F(1,103) = 125.62, p < 
.001. 
Object ratings. Emotion groups did not differ in their overall ratings of object 
desirability or usefulness, emotion group main effect on desirability ratings: F(2,103) = 1.49, p = 
.231; emotion group main effect on usefulness ratings: F(2,103) = 1.97, p = .144; all group 
interactions ns. 
Discussion 
Based on links between uncertainty, anxiety, and acquisitiveness, we hypothesized and 
found evidence that subjects feeling an uncertain emotion, anxiety, acquired about 10% more 
objects than subjects feeling sad or neutral. In line with a previous study showing that anxiety 
leads to increased importance placed on usefulness in the decision process (Raghunathan et al., 
2006), anxious subjects acquired more objects with higher levels of usefulness (functional and 
premium items), but not items low in usefulness (hedonic items). Sadness did not lead to 
increases in overall acquisitiveness. We did not find support for our hypothesis that it would lead 
to increased preferences for desirable, hedonic items. Anxious subjects who acquired more items 
with functional attributes also assigned a higher WTP for functional than hedonic items, 
suggesting anxiety may produce effects at both levels. Sad subjects had a directionally higher 
WTP for the best items (premium items) compared to functional items, suggesting that they may 
value the best items more than those with the lowest possibility of boosting their mood. 
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However, the effect was only marginal so patterns should be replicated in order to establish the 
stability of the difference.  
While the manipulation check verified that the sadness induction was successful and was 
stronger in statistical power than the anxiety induction (sad ηp2 = 0.37, anxious ηp2 = 0.19), we 
did not find any effects of sadness on the overall number of items acquired by sad subjects. 
Additionally, we only found a small effect of sadness on WTP. In the prior work demonstrating 
that sad subjects were willing to pay more they did not investigate any differences across item 
types and they only found effects for subjects who self-focused (Cryder et al. (2008). Our 
induction used the same story between subjects and did not allow us to measure levels of self-
focus, making it difficult to know whether our self-focused sad subjects were driving differences 
in WTP.  
To investigate why we did not find effects of sadness and its relationship with 
acquisitiveness, we capitalize on the fact that sadness may vary from high to low uncertainty. 
This within-emotion variability can lead to changes in information processing and behavioral 
outcomes (Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Using our stories, the passing of a loved one is likely to 
elicit certainty along with feelings of sadness, whereas a living but sick loved one with uncertain 
chances of survival is more likely to elicit uncertainty along with feelings of sadness. Study 2 
aimed to investigate whether higher uncertainty within sadness also activates mechanisms to 
cope via increased object acquisition. 
Study 2 
We devised two new stories to induce uncertain-sadness, certain-sadness, or a neutral 
state before participants made acquisition decisions. As with anxiety, which typically involves 
high uncertainty, we expected that sadness would increase the quantity of objects acquired when 
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accompanied by feelings of uncertainty, but not when accompanied by feelings of certainty. We 
hypothesized that certain-sadness would be more similar to the sadness induced in our first 
study; thus, it was not hypothesized to increase the overall number of objects acquired. 
Methods 
Uncertain and certain stories pre-test. To reliably induce uncertain or certain sadness 
we modified the sad story about the death of your mother from Study 1 (full stories in the 
appendix). To confirm that the stories would elicit differing levels of uncertainty, a sample of 34 
participants from an online US sample were asked to empathize with one of the two modified 
stories as in Study 1. Afterward, subjects answered questions assessing uncertainty appraisals 
(from ` Smith & Ellsworth, 1985): “How uncertain were you about what was happening in the 
story?” and, “How well could you predict what was going to happen in the situation?” As 
desired, participants who read the uncertain-sad story reported feeling more uncertain about what 
was happening, t(32) = 2.78, p < .01 and tended to be less able to predict what was going to 
happen, t(32) = -1.86, p < .10. 
Participants. Two hundred and sixty four (mean age = 19.78 years, SD = 1.71; 131 
females; 6 subjects missing gender data) participants completed Study 2, comprised of both 
University of Michigan undergraduates who participated to fulfill an introductory psychology 
course credit requirement, and participants from the local community who were compensated 
$10 for their time. Five subjects were removed from analysis: three who voluntarily self-reported 
that they did not feel emotions during the emotion induction in their post-task interview, and two 
who asked for the instructions to be repeated multiple times and did not appear to understand the 
instructions. 
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Procedure 
Procedures for this study were very similar to Study 1, but were modified to capture the 
new focus on the level of uncertainty between the two sad stories. Participants empathized with 
the sad-uncertain (mean age = 19.76 years, SD = 1.64, N = 89, 44 females, 4 missing gender), 
sad-certain (mean age = 19.69, SD = 1.64, N = 85, 44 females), or neutral story (mean age = 
19.93, SD = 1.88, N = 85, 42 females, 2 missing gender), between subjects. Before and after each 
story they filled out the self-reported emotion survey to which the term “uncertain” was added 
from the list in Study 1. After rating their post-story affect, all participants performed the ODT 
from Study 1 and reported WTP for each object. Ratings for how useful, how hedonic, and 
estimated cost were removed due to null effects in Study 1. Lastly, participants completed the 
four personality questionnaires from Study 1, as well as the intolerance for uncertainty scale 
(IUS; Sexton & Duglas, 2009) and the intolerance of ambiguity scale (IAS; Budner, 1962) to 
investigate whether trait-level responses to uncertainty exacerbate acquisition on the ODT. The 
IUS has 27 items that measure subjective discomfort with uncertainty and uncertain situations, 
including two factors: negativity (i.e., uncertainty has negative behavioral implications) and 
unfairness (i.e., uncertainty is unfair).  
Results 
Manipulation check. For the manipulation check, change in the single “uncertainty” 
item was tested in addition to the three composite scores for sadness, anxiety, and neutrality. 
Both sad groups felt more sad as a result of reading and empathizing with the uncertain-sad and 
certain-sad stories compared to the neutral story, omnibus: F(6,744) = 30.44, p < .001; post-hoc 
ps < .001. Additionally, both sad groups were more anxious, more uncertain, and less neutral 
than the neutral group, all p < .001. The certain-sad group also became marginally more sad than 
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the uncertain-sad group, post-hoc p = .073. Both the uncertain-sad and certain-sad groups had 
similar levels of anxiety and uncertainty, anxiety post-hoc: p = .769; uncertainty post-hoc: p = 
.997, which precludes us as using the a priori groupings for uncertainty. Since the manipulation 
checks failed to find differences between the uncertain-sad and certain-sad groups, we did not 
want to use the three groups as our independent variable to predict effects on acquisition. 
Instead, we based our analysis upon the emotion factors felt by each individual, regardless of 
their group assignment. 
Patterns of emotions experienced. To separate patterns of emotions experienced, all 
self-reported emotion adjectives were entered into a factor analysis with a Varimax rotation. Five 
factors emerged, which accounted for 65.1% of the variance and had eigenvalues ranging from 
5.34 to 1.85. The five factors (with their name and the emotion adjectives that loaded over 0.50 
on that factor) were: (1) sad (empty, blue, unhappy, miserable, sad, depressed, troubled, upset, 
disappointed); (2) uncertain (nervous, anxious, tense, uncertain, worried, scared, afraid, jittery); 
(3) happy (joyful, pleased, happy, active, and strong); (4) neutral (unemotional, indifferent, and 
neutral); and (5) vigilant (alert and attentive). Factors one through five accounted for 19.08%, 
17.80%, 11.85%, 9.70%, and 6.62% of the variance, respectively. 
Patterns of emotion predict acquisition. To test the influence of emotions on 
acquisition, we created continuous emotion scores by averaging across the emotion adjectives 
with factor loadings higher than 0.50, listed above. As before, we evaluated acquisition using a 
repeated-measures ANOVA with item type (hedonic, functional, premium) and food/non-food 
factors as within-subject variables. Continuous emotion scores for uncertainty, sadness, and 
neutrality were used as the three between-subject predictors. Second-level interactions were 
modeled for anxiety and sadness because we expected uncertainty to vary within sadness, which 
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allowed us to assess whether subjects who felt sad and more or less uncertain show diverging 
effects on consumption. The vigilance composite score was not used to predict acquisition 
because it indexed an a more general arousal state rather than either of the more specific 
affective and appraisal dimensions that we were interested in. 
Feeling more uncertain caused subjects to acquire more objects overall, F(1,230) = 8.99, 
p = .003, Figure 2.1A. The effect of uncertainty increasing acquisition was strongest in subjects 
who felt the least sad, as indicated by the interaction between uncertainty and sadness, F(1,230) 
= 5.96, p = .015. A moderation analysis showed that uncertainty significantly increased 
consumption at low levels of sadness, but the slope of uncertainty on consumption was not 
different from zero at high levels of sadness (slope differences are depicted at low and high 
levels of sadness in Figure 2.1B, and results of the moderation analysis are depicted in Figure 
2.1C). No other main effects were significant on overall consumption, ps > .124. In line with 
previous research, feeling more sad increased acquisition of hedonic items but not functional or 
premium items, item type by sadness: F(2,460) = 3.08, p = .047; hedonic items: β = 17.67, t(230) 
= 2.92, p = .004; functional items: β = 4.77, t(230) = 0.49, p = .494; premium items: β = 3.98, 
t(230) = 0.59, p = .558.
  
Figure 2.1. Effects of emotion factors on acquisition in Study 2 (A, left and B, center), with points jittered to reduce 
overplotting. Scores on the Uncertainty factor are plotted on the x-axis, and the percent of items acquired overall are plotted 
on the y-axis. Slopes are colored by whether subjects’ factor scores were lower than ½ a standard deviation below the mean or 
higher than ½ a standard deviation above the mean. (C) Graphical depiction of moderation analysis depicting the slope of 
uncertainty on acquisition on the y-axis, across levels of sadness (centered) on the x-axis. The solid line depicts the mean 
estimate of the slope, and dashed lines represent the 95% confidence interval.  
A B C 
 
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
Uncertainty, Factor Loading
%
 A
c
q
u
ir
e
d
, 
T
o
ta
l
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
Uncertainty, Factor Loading
%
 A
c
q
u
ir
e
d
, 
T
o
ta
l
●
●
< −0.5 SDs on Blue
> +0.5 SDs on Blue
-1 0 1 2 3
-0
.4
-0
.3
-0
.2
-0
.1
0
.0
0
.1
0
.2
Level of Sadness
S
lo
p
e
 o
f 
A
n
x
ie
ty
 E
ff
e
c
t 
o
n
 C
o
n
s
u
m
p
ti
o
n
-1 0 1 2 3
-0
.4
-0
.3
-0
.2
-0
.1
0
.0
0
.1
0
.2
Level of Anxiety
S
lo
p
e
 o
f 
S
a
d
n
e
s
s
 E
ff
e
c
t 
o
n
 C
o
n
s
u
m
p
ti
o
n
Interaction Effect of Anxiety and Sadness
  
  
  
  
S
lo
p
e 
o
f 
U
n
ce
rt
ai
n
ty
 o
n
 C
o
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
 
3
2
 
  33 
Patterns of emotion predict WTP. Sadness increased WTP overall (as in Cryder et al., 
2008), F(1,230) = 6.22, p = .013. Uncertainty marginally increased WTP, uncertainty main 
effect: F(1,230) = 2.74, p = .099. However, being both sad and uncertain led to decreased WTP, 
sadness by uncertainty interaction: F(1,230) = 4.85, p = .029. This interaction between sadness 
and uncertainty was significant across all item categories except for the least and most acquired 
item categories, an effect that is likely due to floor and ceiling effects, respectively, sadness by 
uncertainty by item type by food/non-food interaction: F(2,460) = 2.83, p = .060; effect in cells 
other than functional foods and premium non-foods, βs < –0.28, ps < .025.  
Discussion 
The results from Study 2 provide evidence that uncertainty increases the quantity of 
objects acquired, even when subjects are induced into an overall sadness-like state. Willingness 
to pay effects were similar, but showed a much stronger overall effect of sadness increasing 
WTP, in line with prior research (Cryder et al., 2008). Interestingly, there was an unexpected 
interaction between sadness and uncertainty. Across acquisition and WTP, subjects who felt low 
levels of sadness had increased acquisition rates and WTP, but subjects who felt higher levels of 
sadness did not show any increase in acquisition rates or WTP.  
Rather than using a simple emotion approach, where each emotion is investigated in 
isolation from others, the current study allowed us to investigate how combinations of emotions 
are associated with consumption. More specifically, while we found a strong effect of 
uncertainty on the quantity of objects acquired, higher feelings of sadness led to the effect of 
uncertainty going away.  
The exact reason for this is unclear, but could be due to opposing appraisals blunting one 
another or emotions combining to create a more unique state. An emotional blunting 
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interpretation (Winterich et al., 2010) suggests that emotions existing on opposing ends of an 
appraisal dimension can cancel each other out. For example, inducing people to feel sad, an 
emotion low in human agency, makes it more difficult to transition to anger, an emotion high in 
human agency, compared to transitioning from a neutral state. In the consumption domain, this 
would imply that uncertainty indeed does increase people’s tendencies to acquire and consume 
more, but that when subjects also feel certain emotions it diminishes the influence of uncertain 
feelings on consumption. A stronger test of this hypothesis would be to use a manipulation to 
increase people’s feelings of certainty, such as having them make estimates of easily predictable 
events, either before or after the uncertainty induction.  
If the blunting account does not explain the data, it could be the case that high- and low-
certainty sadness differ by more than just uncertainty. For example, recent work has investigated 
how mixtures of emotions influence physiological responses (Kreibig et al., 2013). In their study, 
they made participants feel disgust, amusement, or a mixture of disgust and amusement and 
compared their physiological response profiles. Appraisal theories would predict that there 
should be a continual shift in physiological profiles as participants’ responses varied from 
disgust to amusement since they are simply moving along the appraisal dimensions separating 
disgust and amusement. However, they found that the physiological profiles of participants 
feeling mixed disgust-amusement was nothing like physiological profiles of disgust or 
amusement, which they termed an “emergent” physiological profile. If this occurs with other 
mixed emotion states, such as uncertain-sadness in Study 2, then it could be the case uncertain-
sadness differs from certain-sadness by more than just uncertainty. To test this best it would be 
useful to find an emotion that is similar to sadness on many dimensions and can also be altered 
on its level of uncertainty, such as regret. Since certainty refers to the degree to which future 
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events seem predictable and comprehensible you can compare regretful situations that make it 
difficult to predict the future (e.g., regret quitting a disliked job because now you have an 
unpredictable income stream) and regretful situations where it is relatively easy to predict the 
future (e.g., regret leaving your job because you liked your co-workers, even though you like 
your new job and coworkers). If uncertain-regret leads to increased consumption, it suggests that 
the underlying dimension of uncertainty is associated with consumption, but if this effect is not 
found or decreases consumption then it suggests that emergent effects may account for the 
decreased consumption in uncertain-sadness. 
General Discussion 
The two studies reported here are the first emotion manipulation studies to our 
knowledge that investigated increases in acquisitiveness as opposed to shifts in preferences or 
WTP. We demonstrated that uncertainty leads to increased acquisition of items. In Study 1, we 
showed that uncertainty leads to more overall acquisition than sadness or a neutral affective 
state. In Study 2, we found that uncertainty within sadness led to similar increases in the quantity 
of items acquired, but only when the amount of sadness experienced was relatively low.  
Effects of uncertainty and sadness on WTP were less consistent than the effect of 
uncertainty on consumption. In Study 1, there were indications that uncertainty led to higher 
WTP for functional objects and that sadness led to higher WTP for the best items (premium 
items), but these effects were within item types and not between groups. Study 2, however, 
showed a much more reliable and strong effect of sadness increasing WTP. This could be due to 
the technique used to separate emotional states in Study 2. In the second study, our analysis of 
emotions was based on a Varimax separation of emotions that more clearly separates sadness 
from uncertainty, and uses the continuous degree of each felt emotion. If the additional effects 
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coming out in Study 2 compared to Study 1 were due to this analysis strategy then we should 
find similar effects when using this strategy in Study 1. Indeed, using this strategy we find that 
uncertainty is associated with increased acquisitiveness, sadness is associated with increased 
WTP, and uncertain-sadness is associated with decreased WTP; however, the much smaller 
number of subjects do not allow these effects to surpass the traditional level of significance. This 
suggests that the effects produced by the more powerful analysis strategy in Study 2 were also 
apparent in Study 1, but that we did not have enough statistical power to detect them. 
These studies add to the literature by focusing on acquisitiveness and how factors 
influencing acquisitiveness may not influence WTP. We found that uncertainty led to increased 
acquisitiveness, but that sadness led to increased WTP. Though we did not probe the underlying 
reason for this, prior research demonstrated that uncertain emotions lead to systematic processing 
and certain emotions lead to heuristic processing (Tiedens & Linton, 2001), suggesting that 
systematic processing is associated with increased acquisitiveness. Other work in our lab is in 
line with this. A prior study forced subjects to wait longer (5 seconds) before making their 
acquisition or forced them to make it immediately (within 1 second). Systematic processing 
would not have much influence over choices in the 1-second decision window, but should have a 
much stronger influence in the 5-second decision window. Indeed, subjects acquired more 
objects in the 5-second time window, corroborating the idea that systematic processing leads to 
increased acquisitiveness (Preston & Stansfield, unpublished data).  
This work extends to sustainability issues, as our Westernized lifestyle has become much 
more uncertain, stressful, (Cohen & Janicki-Deverts, 2012) and materialistic in the past century 
(Twenge & Kasser, 2013). While these mechanisms of consumption may have originally evolved 
to adaptively secure access to valuable but unpredictable resources (Preston & Vickers, 2014; 
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Vickers & Preston, 2014), they may now be maladaptive in the current environment where stress 
and uncertainty are high, and items are plentiful and inexpensive. Messages promoting 
sustainability tend to use “doom and gloom,” emphasizing our uncertain and fearful future, 
which these studies suggest may backfire and be detrimental to our ultimate goals. Instead, we 
may want to focus on certain emotions that promote engagement in more sustainable behaviors, 
such as pride and love, in order to accomplish longer-term goals for a cleaner, healthier world. 
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Appendix 2A. Item Ratings. 
Table 2.2. Mean ratings (SD) of items on hedonic and usefulness dimensions from Study 1. 
   Rating Type 
Item Type Item Description Hedonic Usefulness 
Hedonic NonFood Silly Bandz 1.58 (1.64) 0.39 (0.82) 
  Lava lamp nightlight 1.86 (1.78) 1.31 (1.51) 
  Paper lanterns 2.57 (2.10) 2.09 (1.94) 
  Poker chips 2.09 (1.80) 1.43 (1.52) 
  Yo Yos 1.37 (1.51) 0.41 (0.82) 
  Newton's Cradle 2.46 (1.93) 0.99 (1.39) 
  Party poppers 1.80 (1.83) 0.70 (1.21) 
  Snow globe 0.81 (1.30) 0.23 (0.48) 
 Food Candies, small hard, assorted 1.64 (1.79) 0.82 (1.10) 
  Chocolate, Hershey's bar 3.02 (1.93) 1.60 (1.58) 
  Ice cream sundae 3.61 (2.16) 1.71 (1.77) 
  Kettle corn 2.98 (1.81) 1.80 (1.52) 
  Truffles, Lindor 3.61 (1.98) 1.91 (1.60) 
  Cookies, Oreos 3.44 (1.98) 2.00 (1.67) 
  Wine, bottle 2.92 (2.20) 1.93 (1.87) 
  Coke, 6 glass bottles 3.01 (2.04) 1.79 (1.56) 
Functional NonFood Ziplock bags 1.59 (1.44) 4.10 (1.43) 
  Hammer 1.20 (1.33) 3.93 (1.66) 
  Paper towels, 6 pack 1.93 (1.74) 4.62 (1.60) 
  Toilet paper, 6 pack 2.07 (1.75) 4.60 (1.67) 
  Surge protector 2.21 (1.85) 4.86 (1.30) 
  Scissors 1.38 (1.42) 4.14 (1.45) 
  Stapler, black 1.56 (1.48) 4.00 (1.73) 
  Umbrella, black 2.73 (1.77) 4.74 (1.23) 
 Food Chicken broth 0.80 (1.13) 1.96 (1.61) 
  Flour 1.01 (1.20) 2.68 (1.95) 
  Beans, black 0.83 (1.34) 1.59 (1.75) 
  Tuna, 4 cans  1.17 (1.48) 1.68 (1.55) 
  Rice, 5 lb bag 1.17 (1.38) 2.46 (1.85) 
  Dehydrated food, 3 items 0.87 (1.22) 1.69 (1.53) 
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   Rating Type 
Item Type Item Description Hedonic Usefulness 
  Multivitamin 1.62 (1.76) 3.01 (2.01) 
  Tomato paste 0.89 (1.21) 1.78 (1.60) 
Premium NonFood G2 Pens 2.48 (1.64) 4.23 (1.33) 
  Burts Bees Lip Balm 2.90 (2.03) 3.64 (1.81) 
  Sharpies 2.68 (1.54) 3.26 (1.63) 
  Sunglasses, aviators 3.93 (1.84) 3.51 (1.76) 
  Bottle opener, silver 1.80 (1.67) 3.41 (1.57) 
  Blanket, UM 4.10 (1.65) 4.22 (1.50) 
  Flash drive 3.47 (1.83) 4.91 (1.41) 
  Maglight 2.08 (1.61) 4.33 (1.51) 
 Food Bottled Water 2.11 (1.70) 3.61 (2.25) 
  Trail mix, single pack 1.96 (1.72) 1.77 (1.66) 
  Odwalla juice 2.98 (1.98) 2.42 (1.70) 
  Ritz, box 2.58 (1.54) 2.03 (1.62) 
  Peanut butter, jar 2.64 (1.79) 2.67 (1.91) 
  Popcorn, salted 2.70 (1.85) 1.88 (1.68) 
  Cashews, canister 2.02 (1.78) 1.78 (1.64) 
  Salsa, 3 jars 2.30 (1.71) 2.13 (1.61) 
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Appendix 2B. Emotion Induction Stories from Study 2. 
Sad-Certain Story 
1.  It is nearing the end of the spring semester and you need a break after a long term. The 
semester has been exhausting, and you could really use some time to relax with your family. It is 
the Sunday two weeks before finals and you have to work on a few assignments. You are in the 
shower, just letting the hot water spill over you when your roommate tells you that you have a 
phone call from your sibling. When you hear your sister (brother) you know that something is 
definitely wrong. She (he) tells you that your mom is very sick in the hospital, and that you need 
to come home.  The doctors said that her condition is terminal, and you need to fly back 
immediately. 
  
2.  The flight home is draining. You are in a daze while you think about your mom and how her 
death will affect you. You feel badly about a recent argument that you had with your mom over 
the phone and wish you had had a chance to say that you were sorry before this happened. You 
know that it is too late now to make that apology because your sibling told you that the doctors 
did not have high hopes. Strangely, it seems as though people on the plane sense your distress 
and look and act sympathetically toward you. 
  
3.  Upon arrival, you take a cab to the hospital in the rain. Once there, you walk down the 
hallways and immediately find your mom’s room. Upon entering, you see the rest of your family 
there. Their faces are pale and drained, their eyes are teary. They are huddled around your mom, 
who looks weakened and frail. Her skin is yellowed and she can barely move. You are 
overwhelmed by your feelings for your mom and how pained she looks. 
  
4.  You go to your mom’s bed and kneel beside her, holding her hand. Her face rocks semi-
consciously, flinching from time to time, and sometimes whimpering at the pain in her body. She 
looks up at you and the rest of the family, with a weak smile as she tries to reassure everyone, 
despite the circumstances. She raises her arms a little under the sheets as if to reach out to you 
and says “you’re all here.” “Of course we are,” you reply. Then she says, “It’s too bad that we all 
have to meet this way, isn’t it?”  
  
5.  As you are watching her, she lays her head back down on the pillow and tells you that she 
feels like she is drifting off. She then closes her eyes and you see that her chest does not rise 
again. You realize she that has just taken her last breath.  
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Sad-Uncertain Story. 
1.  It is nearing the end of the spring semester and you need a break after a long term. The 
semester has been exhausting, and you could really use some time to relax with your family. It is 
the Sunday two weeks before finals and you have to work on a few assignments. You are in the 
shower, just letting the hot water spill over you when your roommate tells you that you have a 
phone call from someone. When you hear your sister (brother) you know that something might 
be wrong, but you aren’t sure what it might be. She (he) says that your mom is very sick and in 
the hospital, but the doctors aren’t sure what is wrong and you need to fly back immediately. 
  
2.  The flight home is confusing. You are in a daze while you try to understand what is 
happening. You think of many positive memories, but also really regret a recent argument that 
you had with your mom over the phone.  Strangely, it seems as though people on the plane sense 
your distress and look and act sympathetically toward you. The captain gets on the intercom and 
says your landing time has been delayed due to a thunderstorm. They are not sure how long it 
will be and you feel badly because you know that the family is all waiting for you to arrive at the 
hospital. 
  
3.  Upon arrival, you take a cab to the hospital in the rain. Once there, you search the hallways 
until you find your mom’s room. Upon entering, you see the rest of your family there. Their 
faces are pale and drained, their eyes are teary. They are huddled around your mom, who looks 
weakened and frail.  Her skin is yellowed and she can barely move. You are overwhelmed by 
your feelings for your mom and how pained she looks. 
  
4.  You go to your mom’s bed and kneel beside her, holding her hand. Her face rocks semi-
consciously, flinching from time to time, and sometimes whimpering at the pain in her body. She 
looks up at you and the rest of the family, seeming to cry and smile at the same time. She raises 
her arms a little under the sheets as if to reach out to you and says, “You’re all here. I wasn't sure 
you would make it.” “We are,” you reply. Then she says, somewhat hesitantly, “It is sort of 
strange being in this place, isn’t it?”  
  
5.  Your mom is being treated by the best doctors, but they still don't know what is wrong with 
her. You all reassure your mom that she will be all right, but no one’s voice sounds hopeful. You 
realize that this situation will not end soon.  
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Chapter 3: Why the Attic Overflows: Individual Differences and Psychopathology  
Predict Material Preferences  
 
Abstract 
Why do people amass goods to the point of financial, domestic, and environmental 
distress? Transient emotions influence product preferences and even sub-clinical 
psychopathologies like anxiety, depression, and obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) can lead 
to overconsumption. To characterize which chronic affective states cause people to want 
particular goods—or an excessive amount—we surveyed controls, “packrats,” and people with 
diagnosed general anxiety disorder (GAD), depression, social anxiety disorder, OCD, or 
panic/agoraphobia. Six item types were revealed that were differentially preferred across groups 
(in parentheses): Scrap Items (packrats, OCD, depression), Memorabilia (controls), Bomb 
Shelter Items (controls, OCD; disliked by panic/agoraphobia), Social & Domestic Goods 
(packrats, depression, panic/agoraphobia), Pets & Snacks, and Impulsively Purchased & Saved 
Items (packrats). Hoarding increased with depression (especially in GAD) and OCD, but each 
was associated with unique item preferences and hoarding symptoms. Thus, our qualitative, 
transdiagnostic approach was able to identify multiple, separable affective pathways to 
consumption. 
Keywords: acquisitiveness, hoarding, consumption, anxiety, depression, obsessive-
compulsive disorder, comorbidity, transdiagnostic
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Introduction 
Hoarding disorder is a challenging and relatively common psychological disorder in 
which individuals acquire and fail to discard so many items that their homes are unlivable, and 
cause significant impairment and distress to patients, their families, and the community. Clinical 
psychology and psychiatry have tried to better understand and treat hoarding by segregating 
those with and without comorbid obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), arguing that most 
individuals with hoarding disorder do not have OCD, while OCD hoarders have a distinct 
presentation (Pertusa et al., 2008; Steketee & Frost, 2003; Tolin & Villavicencio, 2011). The 
general consensus is that hoarding is not necessarily or even primarily associated with OCD; as a 
result, hoarding disorder received its own diagnostic category in the 5th edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-5). Despite this, hoarding disorder is still 
highly comorbid with other disorders not only including OCD but also depression, anxiety, and 
social anxiety disorder among others, and we still do not understand its unique etiology (Pertusa 
et al., 2008). 
Research to date has partially used individuals’ distinct item preferences to segregate 
etiologies of hoarding, but more could be done in this regard. For example, an initial study 
distinguished hoarders with and without OCD, as only the former had magical and superstitious 
reasons for keeping items (Pertusa et al., 2010). But because research has focused on weakening 
the DSM link between hoarding and OCD, most prior studies only examined individuals with 
and without OCD. This has restricted the scope of disorders that have been investigated, 
decreasing the breadth of what we know about the relationship between affective disorders and 
preferences toward material goods. HD is diagnostically distinct from OCD but is comorbid with 
multiple disorders including OCD, depression, generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), and social 
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anxiety disorder (SAD) (Frost et al., 2011; Pertusa et al., 2008). Our own research, which 
investigates hoarding as an individual-differences construct, does find a correlation between the 
quantity of items taken and trait OCD-characteristics, but depression is also prominently 
correlated with hoarding in our samples (e.g., Preston et al., 2009). More research is needed to 
determine if people’s preferences for particular items can be linked to distinct underlying 
psychopathological traits or states. The non-clinical literature has demonstrated that induced 
anxiety in typical populations increases preferences for useful objects, whereas induced sadness 
increases preferences for social objects (Raghunathan et al., 2006). However, they did not study 
individuals with chronic disorders or preferences for large quantities of items.  
The goal of the current study was to provide a wide range of individuals—including those 
with and without hoarding tendencies and a variety of psychopathologies—with a 
comprehensive list of items that people often retain to reveal possible stable relationships 
between chronic affect and consumption. To develop a comprehensive list of goods, we started 
with a priori beliefs about different possible motivations for wanting to acquire and keep goods. 
For example, stuffed animal and doll collections may provide emotional comfort, stand in for 
social relationships, or remind people of their past while newspapers, canned goods, or scrap 
materials appear potentially useful, and stamps and coins are potentially valuable. On the basis of 
such a priori beliefs, the Relationship to Objects Scale (ROS) was created, including ratings 
about motivations for obtaining goods and a large number of objects commonly hoarded and 
retained.  
The current study aimed to demonstrate different preferences for types and quantities of 
goods across a wide range of individuals with and without HD or psychopathology. The 
Relationship to Objects Scale (ROS) assessed preferences for items often kept beyond their 
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utility (e.g., useful, rewarding, sentimental, collectible), which was administered with a validated 
hoarding instrument to non-clinical controls, self-described and validated “packrats,” and 
individuals with diagnosed GAD, SAD, panic/agoraphobia (P/A), Depressive Disorders (DD), 
and OCD. Anxiety disorders were expected to predispose individuals toward useful items and 
depression toward rewarding items, while hoarding symptoms were expected to increase with 
OCD and depression (Coles, Frost, Heimberg, & Steketee, 2003; Preston et al., 2009; Tolin, 
Meunier, Frost, & Steketee, 2011). 
Methods  
Participants 
Controls and packrats. Controls and self-described “packrats” participated in a study 
about decision-making for controls or self-described “packrats” (respectively, n = 180). All 
participants completed the Hoarding Rating Scale (HRS); controls were screened to have scores 
less than 14 and packrats greater than 14 (Tolin, Frost, & Steketee, 2010). Participants also self-
reported psychiatric diagnoses and completed trait measures of depression (the Beck Depression 
Inventory II, BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996), anxiety (the State Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait 
Subscale, STAIT; Spielberger, Gorusch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1977), and OCD (the 
Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory, Revised, OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002). Controls had normal 
mean(SD) levels on the HRS (4.36(3.67)), BDI-II (5.90(5.87)), OCI-R (9.41(8.44)), and STAIT 
(38.19(10.33)). Packrats had high HRS scores (24.83(3.49) and elevated means and wider SD on 
the BDI-II (12.95(12.61)), OCI-R (18.37(14.95)), and STAIT (42.60(11.31)). Seven packrats 
self-reported psychopathology: three major depressive disorder (MDD), one ADD, one 
dysthymia, one MDD with GAD, and one combined MDD, GAD, OCD, and ADHD. None were 
excluded because comorbidities are typical in HD. Participants missing more than three ROS 
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items due to programming error (57 control, 16 packrat) or skipped items (5 controls, 2 packrats) 
were removed from analysis. Controls with self-reported clinical diagnoses (n = 8) or HRS > 14 
(n = 8) were included for factor analysis only. Sixty-one controls (M(SD): age = 36.00(18.74); n 
= 50 females) and 23 packrats (age = 47.83(17.35); n = 22 females) remained for inferential 
comparisons.  
Patients. A stress and anxiety clinic administered the ROS, HRS, Revised Behavior and 
Symptom Identification Scale (BASIS-R; Eisen, Normand, Belanger, Spiro, & Esch, 2004), 
Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS; Goodman et al., 1989) and Sheehan 
Disability Scale (Leon, Olfson, Portera, Farber, & Sheehan, 1997) to 281 patients. Four 
additional participants with depression and six controls were also recruited for a sleep study and 
completed the ROS and HRS. After testing, seven patients were discarded for missing more than 
three ROS items due to programming error, twenty-four for skipping more than three items, and 
one for providing nonsensical data. One control with an HRS > 14 was included only for factor 
analysis. 257 patients and 1 control remained for inferential statistics. A subset of 128 patients 
were also given the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (Taylor, Zvolensky, Cox, Deacon, Heimberg, 
Ledley, ..., & Cardenas, 2007), Penn State Worry Questionnaire (Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & 
Borkovec, 1990), 13 questions on their current symptoms (e.g., worry/anxiety, 
sad/blue/depressed, irritability, etc.), 11 questions on life stresses (e.g., marital conflict, recent 
move, assault, legal problems, etc.), and a self-assessment of sleep problems. 
Clinical patients had a variety of primary, secondary, and additional diagnoses but were 
collapsed into five coherent groups: GAD (n = 56, age M(SD) = 31.54(6.59), 36 females, 8 
unknown), SAD (n = 21, age M(SD) = 26.20(4.66), 10 females, 3 unknown), P/A (n = 43, age 
M(SD) = 39.30(9.09), 26 females; 8 unknown), DD (n = 45, age M(SD) = 58.67(8.74); 21 
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females, 9 unknown; 42 MDD, 3 dysthymia), and OCD (n = 30, age M(SD) = 46.20(17.70); 17 
females, 3 unknown). Patients with unrelated disorders were included for factor analysis but not 
group comparisons (n = 62; e.g., not otherwise specified (NOS), eating disorders). 
The Relationship to Objects Scale 
The Relationship to Objects Scale (ROS) is a novel questionnaire measuring subjective 
interest in household objects that are often retained in the home (Table S1). For each of 57 
objects people indicate “The degree to which you like/have/collect each of the following items, 
whichever applies,” on a Likert scale from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much so). Liking, having, 
and collecting (hereafter operationalized as “preference”) were combined to efficiently assess 
preferences while anchoring responses to possessions. The ROS also includes 12 statements that 
capture behaviors often associated with acquisitiveness, e.g., “I like to bring home items that I 
have found (on the curb, discarded by others).” 
Analysis 
Factor analysis on 359 individuals with Promax rotation identified ROS items that 
intercorrelate. The number of factors was determined using Parallel Analysis with a Monte-Carlo 
simulation, comparing our factor structure to a random data set with the same dimensions. Factor 
analysis cannot use missing data so data were imputed when participants skipped three or fewer 
items using the mean for that item for that group (control, packrat, clinical; 61 or 13% of 
participants; 0.3% of analyzed data; 5% case-wise). 
Saved factor loadings per factor per participant were used to compare groups. Females 
were compared to males; controls, packrats and the five clinical groups were compared; and the 
five clinical groups were re-compared after integrating psychopathological packrats into their 
relevant clinical group (capturing the full expression of HD in psychopathology). Based on 
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threshold recommendations from the literature, seven packrats with BDI-II ≥ 13 were added to 
DD (Beck et al., 1996) and three with OCI-R ≥ 14 were added to OCD (Abramowitz & Deacon, 
2006). All group comparisons used repeated-measures ANOVAs with the six factors as the 
repeated variable and group as the between-subjects variable. Post-hoc tests were corrected using 
Tukey tests; t-tests compared genders. The alpha threshold for significance was set at .05. 
Results  
Revealing Six Object Factors 
We identified six item factors that accounted for 47.3% of the variance (Table S1-3): (1) 
Scrap Items—low-value items that are reused or repurposed like plastic bags or scraps of wood, 
paper or fabric; (2) Memorabilia—sentimental items like ticket stubs, awards, photos; (3) Bomb 
Shelter Items—durable items like toilet paper, canned food, bottled water, old bills; (4) Social & 
Domestic Goods—items with aesthetic/social value like art, platters, wine glasses, heirlooms; (5) 
Pets & Snacks—intrinsically rewarding items like pets, small mammals, candy, soda; and (6) 
Impulsively Purchased & Saved Items—hedonic items or impulse purchases like magazines, 
stuffed animals, purses and problems discarding and over-acquiring. 
Qualitative Associations between Item Type and Group 
Gender. Females preferred all item types more than males, F(1,322) = 16.17, ηp2 = 0.05, 
p < .001, especially Memorabilia, Social & Domestic Goods, and Impulsively Purchased & 
Saved Items, interaction: F(5,1610) = 11.58, ηp2 = 0.04, p < .001, gender within types, ts(322) > 
2.09, ηp2s range = 0.01-0.12, ps < .038. Males did not prefer any types over females, ts(322) < 
1.56. 
Seven non-clinical and clinical groups. As expected, packrats preferred all object types 
over controls and the five clinical groups. Controls also preferred all types more than all clinical 
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groups except OCD (between packrats and the remaining clinical groups), main effect, F(6,273) 
= 11.35, ηp2 = 0.20, p < .001; post-hoc packrats > all groups, ps < .01; controls > GAD, SAD, 
P/A, DD, ps < .028.  
Looking at relative preferences within types across groups, controls and packrats 
preferred certain items but clinical groups did not prefer any types above packrats or controls, 
group x factor: F(30,1365) = 3.06, ηp2 = 0.06, p < .001; group effect within factors: Fs(6,273) > 
3.01, ps < .007, ηp2 range = 0.06-0.22; Pets & Snacks, p = .127 (Figure 3.1). Items were least 
preferred by GAD, P/A and SAD; Controls preferred Scrap Items significantly more than P/A 
and GAD, Memorabilia more than all clinical groups, and Bomb Shelter Items over GAD, P/A, 
and DD. Packrats preferred Scrap Items more than all groups, Memorabilia more than clinical 
groups (being similar to controls), Bomb Shelter Items more than GAD and P/A (similar to 
controls, DD, and OCD), Social & Domestic Goods over all groups, and Impulsively Purchased 
& Saved Items over GAD and P/A. They were also marginally higher on Social/Domestic goods 
than SAD (similar to controls, DD, and OCD). 
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Figure 3.1. (A) Mean factor loadings across all seven groups. (B) mean factor loadings 
across the five clinical groups, including packrats with psychopathology (DD or OCD). 
GAD = Generalized anxiety disorder. SAD = Social anxiety disorder. P/A = 
Panic/agoraphobia. DD = Depressive disorder. OCD = Obsessive-compulsive disorder. C = 
Control. P = Packrat. 
 
Five clinical groups including packrats. Excluding controls and nonpathological 
packrats (but including DD or OCD packrats in their relevant clinical group) enhanced 
differences across clinical groups, group by factor: F(20,1000) = 2.60, ηp2 = 0.05, p < .001; 
effect of group within Scrap, Bomb Shelter, & Social and Domestic: Fs(4,200) > 2.83, ps < .026, 
ηp2 range = 0.05-0.09; all other factors, ps > .124. Scrap Items were more preferred by DD than 
GAD and P/A, and marginally more by OCD than P/A. Bomb Shelter Items were more preferred 
by OCD than GAD and marginally over P/A. Social & Domestic Goods were significantly more 
preferred by DD and marginally more preferred by P/A over SAD. Thus, while patients had 
below-average interest in goods compared to controls and packrats, they still had relative 
preference differences. DD and OCD were more interested in most items than GAD, SAD, and 
P/A and both liked Scrap and Impulsively Purchased & Saved Items. However, only OCD 
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significantly preferred Memorabilia, Bomb Shelter Items, and Pets & Snacks while only DD 
preferred Social & Domestic Items and had mean preferences for Scraps over OCD—preferences 
more like those of packrats per se. 
Transdiagnostic Approach: Qualitative Associations Across Clinical Diagnoses 
In order to supplement the prior analysis with a transdiagnostic approach, we clustered 
patients based on all of the personality and symptom scales to give us different “types” of 
patients. These clusters were then compared on the ROS factor scores to investigate whether sub-
classifications of patients have different acquisition tendencies. 
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Figure 3.2. Group differences on variables that went into the clustering solution for the 
patients. Variables significant at the p < .05 level are plotted on the y-axis, sorted by the 
group with the highest value. Clusters are separated by color. Error bars represent the 
average standard error of the mean. BASIS = Behavior and Symptom Identification Scale. 
CS = Current symptoms. LS = Life stress. 
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Clustering. All personality and symptom scales in the patients were used in a 
hierarchical clustering analysis with Ward’s method. Upon reviewing the clustering solutions, 
three clusters split subjects well while retaining a sufficient number of subjects per cluster for 
group-level comparisons on the ROS factors. Based on comparisons between groups at the p < 
.05 level, the first cluster (C1; n = 65) had few affective problems generally but some 
interpersonal stress. The second cluster (C2; n = 16) had sleep and self-harm problems. The third 
and last cluster (C3; n = 47) had a high degree of worry, anxiety, and sleep problems. Significant 
group comparisons based on the clustering variables are plotted in Figure 3.2, with all data 
standardized for easier comparisons. 
Clustering differences in acquisition patterns. The three-cluster solution was then re-
coded for comparisons with controls and packrats on each of the ROS factors. Collapsing across 
all factors, there was a main effect of group due to packrats being significantly higher than all 
groups, ps < .01, and controls being higher than the clinical clusters, ps < .05, omnibus main 
effect, F(4,208) = 12.81, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.20. There was also a group by factor interaction, 
F(20,1040) = 3.67, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.067. 
Groups differed on all factor scores except for Pets & Snacks, Fs(4,208) > 2.90, ps < 
.030, ηp2 s > 0.050; Pets & Snacks F(4,208) = 1.61, p = .173. Packrats were higher than all 
groups on Scrap Items and Social & Domestic factors, ps < .030. Packrats were also higher than 
all of the patient clusters on Memorabilia, but did not differ from Controls. Finally, Packrats 
were more interested in Bomb Shelter and Impulsive Spending & Saving factors than the low 
affective problems cluster (C1), ps < .040. Controls were higher than all clinical groups on 
Memorabilia and Bomb Shelter items, ps < .05, and higher than the worry and anxious cluster 
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(C3) on Scrap Items, p = .042. None of the patient groups differed from one another on the ROS 
factors. All differences are shown in Figure 3.3. 
Figure 3.3. Group differences in ROS factor scores between clustered patient groups, 
controls, and packrats. ROS factors are listed along the y-axis, mean factor scores and 
standard errors of the mean along the x-axis, and groups are separated by color. 
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memorabilia, durable/utilitarian items, social and domestic goods, pets and snacks, and trouble 
with impulsive purchases and discard decisions. Most of these categories were expected, apart 
from the fact that pets and snacks formed a single factor. Likely, pets and snacks are both 
underserved by dopaminergic reward processes like drugs of abuse, chocolate, and food-storing 
(S. D. Preston, 2013)—suggesting that this system should be investigated in people who hoard 
animals. 
Females were more interested in goods than males, particularly memorabilia, social and 
domestic goods, and impulsively purchased and saved items. The ROS may have been biased 
toward females, but females also suffer more from comorbid anxiety and depression (Cummings, 
Caporino, & Kendall, 2013) and have higher hoarding symptoms in our sample on the HRS, 
which is not gender biased. However, further research must examine gender differences since 
laboratory research often shows a female selection bias despite finding higher male prevalence in 
epidemiological studies (Samuels et al., 2008), and we found higher HD symptoms in OCD 
women as opposed to a prior study (Tolin et al., 2011). 
Packrats were defined by their greater preference for all goods, but still exhibited 
informative relative preferences. Both packrats and controls preferred goods in general more 
than clinical groups, confirming that mental illness alone cannot create hoarding problems. 
Packrats’ problems with scrap items and acquiring or keeping items impulsively is already well 
documented (Frost & Gross, 1993; Frost, Steketee, & Williams, 2002; Grisham, Brown, Savage, 
Steketee, & Barlow, 2007). However, the fact that they preferred social and domestic goods 
more than controls, and bomb shelter items less than controls suggests that their motivation is not 
homologous to the drive to save survival-related items as in food-storing rodents, but rather the 
drive to use goods as a social display as in bowerbirds (S. D. Preston, 2013). Their interest in 
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social/domestic items also suggests a strong social motivation, despite or possibly due to having 
marked interpersonal problems (Frost, Steketee, Williams, & Warren, 2000; Tolin, Frost, 
Steketee, & Fitch, 2008).  
Unique Clinical Preferences 
Patients were less interested in goods but did have informative relative preferences. The 
only P/A preference was to prefer social and domestic goods more than social anxiety patients, 
perhaps because the home provides a safe space for this population. GAD’s general disinterest in 
goods was surprising since the disorder is often comorbid with HD (Frost et al., 2011) and GAD 
exacerbated hoarding with depression in our sample. GAD’s specific problem over-acquiring 
may be harder to reveal with a survey measure that lacks incentive salience, or GAD may only 
produce hoarding problems with comorbid depression. 
Depression and OCD were both more interested in goods than other patients and equally 
preferred scrap and impulse items—similarities that explain why it has been hard to disentangle 
the relevance of both disorders to HD. However, only OCD preferred memorabilia, bomb shelter 
items, and pets and snacks above average, while only DD preferred social and domestic items 
(and to some extent scraps). Thus, otherwise-similar looking problems with goods can be 
disentangled through a more substantive analysis of the types of items preferred.  
Transdiagnostic Approach to Across Clinical Disorders 
Using our clustering approach we were able to ignore the disorders that subjects were 
diagnosed with and investigate how their overall symptomology influenced qualitative patterns 
in object acquisition. We found three distinct groups of patients: One with very few symptoms 
and little life impairment, one primarily with sleep and self-harm problems, and a third that had 
worry, anxiety and sleep problems along with higher levels of impairment more generally.  
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Again we found that Packrats tended to have the largest interest in most goods, but this 
was mainly due to Packrats being higher than the least impaired patients (C1). Additionally, the 
anxious and depressed patient cluster (C3) was uniquely disinterested in acquiring Scrap Items 
compared to controls, suggesting that the combination of anxiety and depression may decrease 
the desire to acquire things that they do not have an immediate use for. This is interesting 
because both anxiety and depression are highly comorbid with hoarding disorder, yet their object 
preferences were opposite on the Scrap Items factor that most-differentiated the Packrats from 
the other groups. This pattern of anxiety and depression leading to decreased acquisition has 
been found before (Preston & Vickers, 2014), but leaves open questions regarding differences in 
the unique contributions of anxiety, sadness/depression, and anxious-sadness/depression 
combined. While this data across studies is consistent with one another, future research should 
examine and replicate this finding with alternate paradigms and other participant pools. 
A Social View of Hoarding 
Research on hoarding and consumer psychology supports our nascent emphasis on social 
drives in packrats and depressed individuals. For example, HD is often associated with greater 
attachments to goods (Frost & Gross, 1993; Grisham et al., 2009; Steketee et al., 2003). 
Hoarding is also associated with trait empathy, and depression with GAD (our most severe 
comorbidity) uniquely predict empathic fantasy (Fontenelle et al., 2009). HD is also associated 
with higher rates of SAD (Coles et al., 2003) and individuals with SAD report keeping items to 
improve their social appearance (Vigne, de Menezes, Yücel, & Fontenelle, 2013), just as typical 
people rely more on goods after feeling rejected (Mead, Baumeister, Stillman, Rawn, & Vohs, 
2011). 
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Goods are often regarded in consumer psychology as symbolic forms of social identity, 
bi-directionally helping consumers determine and refine their self-concept while communicating 
that identity to others (Belk, 1988; Solomon, 1983). Research even specifically suggests that the 
interest by packrats and depressed patients in aesthetic items reflects a need for self-affirmation 
(Townsend & Sood, 2012), making self-affirmation a potentially useful future intervention. 
Further research needs to determine the degree to which individuals rely on social and aesthetic 
goods to communicate their worth to themselves or others, to soothe themselves, or simply to 
enhance the home environment in populations who do spend disproportionate amounts of time at 
home. 
Conclusion 
Despite the fact that people spend significant time, energy, and money acquiring material 
goods and maintaining order over their possessions, they rarely consider why they have so many 
things that they rarely use. Clinicians also fail to deeply examine people’s possessions as 
indications of their underlying issues, making it difficult to understand HD (but see Pertusa et al., 
2008). Virtually no one considers how affective states that are so common in the general 
population—like depression and anxiety—potentiate our already strained relationship with goods 
(but see Preston & Vickers, 2014). Through a detailed investigation, we found distinct material 
preferences within and across multiple psychopathologies associated with different underlying 
motivations. Our results suggest that depression plays a strong role in increased acquisition, but 
that depression may with high comorbid anxiety may have decreased acquisition problems. Our 
trans-diagnostic, qualitative approach is in keeping with the directives of the National Institutes 
of Health and can be applied broadly to ameliorate the effects of chronic affect on well-being and 
the environment. 
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Appendix 3A. Relationship to Objects Scale. 
Table 3.1. Factor loadings for 5-factor relationship to objects scale solution. Motivational items are identified with quotations. 
 
Item  
Factor 1:  
 
Scrap 
Items 
Factor 2:  
 
Memorabilia 
Factor 3:  
 
Bomb 
Shelter 
Factor 4:  
 
Social / 
Domestic 
Factor 5:  
 
Pets & 
Snacks 
Factor 6: 
Impulsive 
Buying & 
Saving 
1. 1 Repair 0.75 0.38 0.35 0.47 0.28 0.23 
2.  “I like to bring home items that I have found 
(on the curb, discarded by others) because I 
can fix them up and/or find a use for them.” 
0.68 0.20 0.17 0.28 0.20 0.28 
3.  Newspaper 0.68 0.36 0.32 0.22 0.24 0.14 
4.  Flyers 0.68 0.50 0.44 0.25 0.25 0.22 
5.  Packing 0.64 0.36 0.40 0.55 0.19 0.16 
6.  Wood scraps 0.62 0.23 0.25 0.42 0.19 0.03 
7.  Paper scraps 0.59 0.43 0.41 0.33 0.23 0.32 
8.  “I tend to keep information from 
newspapers, magazines, bills, or mailings 
because I may need them or can use them 
later.” 
0.58 0.34 0.32 0.23 -0.07 0.41 
9.  Bags 0.57 0.42 0.53 0.25 0.17 0.25 
10.  “I buy or keep things because I know that 
one day they will be valuable and I can sell 
them for a profit.” 
0.56 0.33 0.33 0.28 0.11 0.31 
11.  “I have trouble with clutter in my office or 
home, with multiple piles of stuff and 
difficulty finding things when I need them.” 
0.55 0.34 0.19 0.25 0.19 0.39 
12.  Coins 0.52 0.50 0.32 0.23 0.37 0.15 
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Item  
Factor 1:  
 
Scrap 
Items 
Factor 2:  
 
Memorabilia 
Factor 3:  
 
Bomb 
Shelter 
Factor 4:  
 
Social / 
Domestic 
Factor 5:  
 
Pets & 
Snacks 
Factor 6: 
Impulsive 
Buying & 
Saving 
13.  Stamps 0.50 0.46 0.27 0.34 0.32 0.10 
14.  Awards 0.27 0.75 0.41 0.29 0.13 0.23 
15.  Memorabilia 0.28 0.70 0.35 0.43 0.14 0.38 
16.  Tickets 0.40 0.66 0.25 0.14 0.19 0.25 
17.  Photos 0.24 0.65 0.50 0.53 0.15 0.45 
18.  Pens 0.55 0.62 0.49 0.30 0.29 0.41 
19.  CDs 0.19 0.61 0.48 0.26 0.30 0.25 
20.  Keychains 0.53 0.60 0.44 0.19 0.42 0.36 
21.  Pencils 0.56 0.58 0.48 0.23 0.32 0.29 
22.  Electronics 0.25 0.58 0.49 0.20 0.18 0.13 
23.  Artwork 0.34 0.56 0.20 0.40 0.17 0.25 
24.  “I have trouble getting rid of things from my 
past, like old letters, school assignments, 
artwork and such.” 
0.53 0.55 0.19 0.21 0.05 0.48 
25.  School assignments 0.38 0.55 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.21 
26.  Books 0.33 0.53 0.36 0.38 0.15 0.44 
27.  Toilet paper 0.27 0.30 0.74 0.36 0.36 0.21 
28.  Canned food 0.41 0.30 0.72 0.39 0.39 0.20 
29.  Snacks 0.21 0.48 0.67 0.22 0.54 0.44 
30.  Water 0.18 0.33 0.66 0.11 0.39  0.26 
31.  Financial records 0.31 0.43 0.64 0.35 -0.11 0.11 
32.  Paper plates 0.31 0.19 0.64 0.48 0.17 0.26 
33.  T-shirts 0.28 0.63 0.63 0.08 0.33 0.32 
34.  Bills 0.35 0.39 0.60 0.30 -0.10 0.15 
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Item  
Factor 1:  
 
Scrap 
Items 
Factor 2:  
 
Memorabilia 
Factor 3:  
 
Bomb 
Shelter 
Factor 4:  
 
Social / 
Domestic 
Factor 5:  
 
Pets & 
Snacks 
Factor 6: 
Impulsive 
Buying & 
Saving 
35.  Shoes 0.14 0.51 0.58 0.40 0.33 0.47 
36.  Coupons 0.45 0.40 0.56 0.38 0.26 0.36 
37.  Soda 0.03 0.13 0.54 0.04 0.51 0.31 
38.  Mugs 0.49 0.35 0.53 0.37 0.32 0.35 
39.  Tools 0.43 0.31 0.49 0.43 0.14 -0.07 
40.  Hats 0.25 0.38 0.44 0.24 0.23 0.24 
41.  Gift wrap 0.42 0.47 0.52 0.70 0.19 0.37 
42.  Framed art 0.33 0.30 0.32 0.70 0.26 0.31 
43.  Platters 0.38 0.26 0.56 0.69 0.16 0.18 
44.  Used furniture 0.62 0.28 0.37 0.66 0.26 0.20 
45.  Furniture 0.41 0.20 0.17 0.64 0.24 0.16 
46.  Fabric 0.59 0.27 0.30 0.60 0.20 0.25 
47.  Heirlooms 0.30 0.55 0.32 0.60 0.05 0.31 
48.  Wine glasses 0.30 0.37 0.39 0.59 0.30 0.25 
49.  Retro 0.49 0.38 0.33 0.57 0.34 0.31 
50.  “I keep a supply of things that will be handy 
when people come over (e.g. serving plates, 
candles, games, or particular music).” 
0.12 0.34 0.39 0.49 -0.05 0.39 
51.  Money/savings 0.24 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.13 0.02 
52.  Pets 0.15 0.25 0.36 0.40 0.72 0.37 
53.  Dogs 0.09 0.27 0.32 0.35 0.71 0.30 
54.  Small mammals 0.35 0.25 0.23 0.12 0.69 0.12 
55.  Cats 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.28 0.63 0.20 
56.  Fish 0.27 0.23 0.34 0.02 0.61 0.12 
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Item  
Factor 1:  
 
Scrap 
Items 
Factor 2:  
 
Memorabilia 
Factor 3:  
 
Bomb 
Shelter 
Factor 4:  
 
Social / 
Domestic 
Factor 5:  
 
Pets & 
Snacks 
Factor 6: 
Impulsive 
Buying & 
Saving 
57.  Birds 0.24 0.14 0.24 0.13 0.57 0.14 
58.  Can y 0.26 0.42 0.48 0.09 0.53 0.31 
59.  “I often take in animals that are stray or that 
other people say they can no longer take care 
of.” 
0.31 0.10 0.09 0.26 0.47 0.38 
60.  “I try to display things in my home or garden 
that represent who I am and what I am like.” 
0.07 0.23 0.18 0.41 0.06 0.63 
61.  “I will always keep something that was given 
to me, especially if it was a gift from 
someone that I like, even if I don't 
particularly need the item.” 
0.33 0.46 0.29 0.15 0.17 0.57 
62.  “Friends or family have complained about 
how much or how often I buy things (at 
stores, online, through catalogs, or in 
response to television ads or home 
shopping).” 
0.28 0.30 0.26 0.07 0.35 0.55 
63.  Purses 0.28 0.59 0.45 0.39 0.28 0.53 
64.  Stuffed animals 0.20 0.53 0.21 0.19 0.28 0.51 
65.  Candles 0.27 0.32 0.55 0.45 0.36 0.51 
66.  Magazines 0.46 0.34 0.46 0.32 0.30 0.49 
67.  “I have special places where I keep certain 
food items.” 
0.22 0.17 0.39 0.14 0.23 0.47 
68.  “I have one or more collections of things that 
I actively add to or maintain.” 
0.38 0.29 0.16 0.20 0.19 0.46 
69.  Dolls 0.24 0.23 0.19 0.21 0.13 0.26 
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Table 3.2. Correlation matrix of 5-factor relationship to objects solution. 
 
Factor 
Factor Number: Name 2 3 4 5 6 
1: Scrap Items 0.44 0.36 0.34 0.24 0.22 
2: Memorabilia 
 
0.5 0.31 0.25 0.4 
3: Bomb Shelter Items 
  
0.38 0.33 0.33 
4: Social & Domestic Goods 
   
0.15 0.27 
5: Pets & Snacks 
    
0.28 
6: Impulsively Purchased & Saved Items 
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Table 3.3. Factors of the relationship to objects scale and Tukey corrected post-hoc tests from analyses across the seven groups 
and five clinical groups. Eigenvalues, percent of variance explained by each factor, and top five items on each factor. 
Motivational items included as partial sentences. 
Factor  
Eigenvalue,  
% Variance 
Factor 
Name Top Items 
Results Across  
All 7 Groups 
Results Across 5  
Clinical Groups 
1 19.26 27.91% Scrap Items Fixing up found items; 
newspaper;  
flyers; packing supplies 
Packrats > All groups*** DD > P/A***, GAD* 
Controls > P/A*, GADt OCD > P/At 
2 23.59 5.20% Memorabilia Awards; memorabilia; 
old tickets; photos; pens 
Controls > All groups, but Packrats*** ns post-hocs 
Packrats > All, but controls** 
3 3.05 4.42% Bomb 
Shelter 
Items 
Toilet paper; canned 
foods; snacks;  
water; financial records 
Controls > GAD**, P/A**, DD* OCD > GAD*, P/At 
Packrats > GAD*, P/A* 
4 2.72 3.94% Social & 
Domestic 
Goods 
Gift wrap; framed art; 
platters;  
used furniture, furniture 
Packrats > GAD***, DD***, SAD***, 
OCD***, Controls***, P/A** 
DD > SAD* 
P/A > SADt 
5 2.27 3.29% Pets & 
Snacks 
Pets; dogs; small 
mammals; cats; fish 
 ns post-hocs 
6 1.78 2.58% Impulsively 
Purchased & 
Saved Items 
Displaying identity 
buying;  
purses; stuffed animals 
Packrats > GAD**, P/A**, SADt ns post-hocs 
Note: GAD = Generalized Anxiety Disorder. SAD = Social Anxiety Disorder. P/A = Panic/Agoraphobia. DD = Depressive 
Disorder. OCD = Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder.  
*** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05. t p < .10. 
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Chapter 4: Maternal and Charitable Caregiving in the Brain: Motor-Motivational 
Influences on Decisions to Donate to Charities 
 
Abstract 
The majority of research in the field of altruism and empathy focuses on small acts of aid 
or warm, empathic consolation of people in negative circumstances. These types of models do 
not subsume the many acts of heroic aid, such as people putting themselves in bodily danger by 
jumping into freezing rivers to save unrelated individuals. The Offspring Caregiving Model 
(OCM) of altruism (Preston, 2013) distinguishes these more immediate, heroic actions that 
involve motor-motivational systems and longer-term, nurturant help behaviors that involve 
sympathy. The OCM suggests that bringing online processes associated with activation/arousal 
will make people more likely to help. To test this model, we created descriptions of charities that 
were nurturant or heroic, and varied in the extent that they made participants feel 
activation/arousal. Participants viewed charities, earned money, and made decisions to donate 
money to each charity while their brain activation was measured. While a priori classifications 
of the charities did not produce differences in donations, continuous measures along dimensions 
of interest showed that participants donated more to charities that were more nurturant (vs. 
heroic), and nurturant charities that were higher in activation/arousal (vs. lower in 
activation/arousal) received higher donations. Additionally, these nurturant-active charities led to 
the most robust brain activation in areas previously associated with warm feelings toward others 
and increased donations.   
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Introduction 
 
Extensive behavioral evidence suggests that people can and do act altruistically, helping 
others at a cost to the self (Stephane D Preston, 2013). However, many real-world acts of 
altruism, such as jumping into an icy river to save a baby, involve putting oneself into dangerous 
circumstances. Other acts of altruism, such as soothing and comforting a friend after the loss of a 
close family member, involve less danger. The present study aimed to investigate how types of 
helping actions lead to differential support, as well as the underlying neural activity associated 
with these behaviors. 
Prior work in empathy and altruism has been focused on feelings about another person in 
need of help. Feeling similar either in the form of affective resonance or emotional contagion 
(i.e., feeling similar or feeling “with” the target) or overlap in mental and neural representations 
(Preston & de Waal, 2002) leads to increased helping. Sympathy and empathic concern involve 
warm, caring feelings for others that typically lead to an increased desire to help and helping 
behaviors. On the other hand, personal distress involves feeling troubled, upset, and worried and 
these feelings lead to disengagement and less helping (Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987; 
Preston & Hofelich, 2012). However, this work has typically focused on prototypical others 
where their distress is abundant, others that do not encompass the heroic acts documented in 
newspaper stories. 
The Offspring Caregiving Model of Altruism (OCA) (Preston, 2013) has extended prior 
work to multiple aspects of the target in need and the helping act. At the target-level, when the 
target is vulnerable, unable to help itself, or close to you (e.g., family members or close friends) 
helping is increased. Perceptions of the target being distressed or in need (the target’s state-level) 
also lead to increased helping from others. Finally, at the response-level, helping behaviors are 
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increased when the observer can bring to mind a clear, effective plan that they are able to 
implement without fear of harm to the self. A number of studies have investigated factors at the 
target- and state-level, but much less has been done at the response-level, which is the focus of 
the current study. 
The OCA distinguishes two types of helping behaviors (Preston, 2013). Heroic behaviors 
involve putting the self at bodily risk to help another, such as jumping into icy waters to save a 
drowning child. In contrast, nurturant behaviors involve comforting and soothing others that are 
distressed by their current circumstances, such as comporting people who have lost someone 
close to them or apes soothing others who have lost a fight and status. Both types of behaviors 
can lead to helping via the mesolimbic reward system that includes structures such as the ventral 
tegmental area (VTA) and nucleus accumbens (NAcc), but the two may be hindered by different 
factors. Heroic behaviors are very dangerous and helpers may disengage from helping if they 
perceive that the situation is too risky or if they do not have the expertise to deal with the 
circumstances (e.g., untrained onlookers being more reluctant to rush into a burning building to 
save another person). Nurturant behaviors are less dangerous but can result in disengagement if 
the other displays extreme distress that the helper does not want to or cannot cope with (Batson 
et al., 1987; Hauser, Preston, & Stansfield, 2014). These heroic and nurturant responses were the 
first factor investigated in the current study. 
The second factor that we investigated was whether the activation of motor-motivational 
representations would increase helping behaviors. Seeing another in distress automatically 
activates cognitive and neural representations associated with the other’s distress (Preston & de 
Waal, 2002), including representations of helping actions. The OCA proposes that if the 
perception of another’s distress leads helpers to bring online motor representations associated 
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with acting then they are more likely to help. Prior work in our lab found support for the idea that 
more active associations lead to more help than passive, preparatory associations. When subjects 
processed more active forms of helping they donated more to charities compared to processing 
more passive, preparatory helping (Vickers & Preston, in prep). The limitation of this study was 
in its behavioral nature, meaning that it was unable to inform our hypotheses regarding the 
activation of neural representations.  
The aim of the current study was to replicate our work in charitable donations and test the 
underlying neural hypotheses proposed by the OCA. In the present study, participants earned real 
money and made donation decisions while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) to measure brain activation. Participants viewed descriptions of charities that used 
framing to vary the desired dimensions (nurturant vs. heroic; passive and preparatory vs. active). 
For example, the four framings for capsized boaters were, “jumping in to retrieve people whose 
boats capsized in a storm with special harnesses” (heroic-active), “administering warming 
treatments to boaters rescued from capsized boats during storms” (nurturant-active), “making 
special harnesses to safely rescue boaters from capsized boats during storms” (heroic-passive), 
and “purchasing warming blankets to treat boaters rescued from capsized boats during storms” 
(nurturant-passive). Participants viewed these charities and made donation decisions, with 
subsequent analyses looking at differences in donations and neural activation. 
In line with prior behavioral work (Vickers & Preston, in prep) we hypothesized that 
nurturant and heroic frames would lead to differential activation of the underlying neural 
circuitry. Building upon evidence that feelings of activation and arousal lead to greater helping, 
we hypothesized that there would be a main effect of greater donations to active than passive 
charities.  
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Fewer studies have looked at differences in neural activation while subjects made 
charitable donations, but implicate the reward system in increased donations. Moll et al. (2006) 
found that subjects activated similar areas when making donations to charities and receiving 
money, suggesting a strong overlap in processing, and that decisions to donate at a cost to the 
self activated the anterior pre-frontal cortex (PFC). Another study investigated the neural 
underpinnings of the identifiable victim effect, whereby identifiable victims receive higher 
donations than anonymous victims (Genevsky, Västfjäll, Slovic, & Knutson, 2013). They found 
that helping identifiable victims activated brain regions associated with facial processing 
(bilateral fusiform cortices), but only activation in the NAcc was associated with increased 
donations to identifiable compared to anonymous victims.  
The MCMA proposes parallel neural processing associated with approach and reward 
compared to avoidance and fear. Since nurturant and active charities are associated with 
increased donations, we hypothesized that they would activate the reward-route (e.g., VTA, 
NAcc) compared to heroic and passive charities. Multiple forms of motor priming led to higher 
donations, which we hypothesized is mediated by the activation of motor representations. Since 
complex motor representations are stored in the premotor area, we hypothesized that active 
charities would activate the premotor area more than passive charities, and that activation of the 
premotor area would be associated with increased donations.  
Methods 
Participants 
Thirty-one (31; N = 15 females) people from the local Ann Arbor, Michigan community 
participated and were compensated $40 for their time plus token bonuses, explained below. 
Participants were screened via phone for MRI contraindications, to ensure that they were 
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between 18 and 30 years of age, right handed, and had no history of neurological or psychiatric 
illness. Two subjects were removed, one due to a power outage at the fMRI center and one due 
to excessive head movement (larger than ± 3 mm), leaving 29 subjects for analysis (mean age = 
21.62 years, SD = 2.68). All procedures were approved by the University of Michigan Medical 
Institutional Review Board. 
Procedure  
Upon entry to the University of Michigan Functional MRI Lab, subjects were consented 
and provided an overview of the study. In the Charity Donation task, subjects saw descriptions of 
an activity performed by a charity and were given the opportunity to donate to that charity. 
Afterward, they performed three shorter “localizer” tasks. The goal of the first and second 
localizers was to isolate activity associated with more complex motor procedures (e.g., pre-motor 
and supplementary motor areas) but not also activated during primary motor procedures (e.g., 
primary motor cortex). The third localizer aimed to isolate areas associated with warm, nurturant 
feelings toward a vulnerable other.  
In the first localizer, the Motor Tapping task, participants tapped their left and right index 
fingers in blocks. In the second localizer, the Motor Retrieval task, participants viewed pictures 
of objects and either imagined reaching out and grabbing them or watched them on the screen. In 
the third localizer, the Nurturance task, participants passively viewed images of adults and babies 
on the screen.  
Before going into the fMRI scanner, subjects performed 6 trials of the main donation task 
and two blocks of each localizer on a computer outside the scanner for practice. Subjects were 
then situated in the scanner with five-button custom response claws on their left and right hands, 
allowing 10 possible responses. We then acquired a high resolution T1-weighted scan for 
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normalization purposes, four runs of the main charitable donation task, and one run each of the 
Motor Tapping localizer, Motor Retrieval localizer, Nurturance localizer, and a high resolution 
SPGR anatomical scan. Total scan duration was approximately 45 minutes. Outside the scanner, 
participants subsequently made ratings of the charities and then filled out personality 
questionnaires. The total study took about 2 hours. 
Charitable donation task. The charitable donation task consisted of intermixed Charity 
only or Charity plus Donation trials (see Figure 4.1). After the suggestions of prior work 
(Ollinger, Corbetta, & Shulman, 2001; Ollinger, Shulman, & Corbetta, 2001), 2/3 of trials 
included donation responses while the other 1/3 of trials were “catch” trials that had the charity 
description only. This design was employed to dissociate BOLD activity in response to charity 
evaluation versus donation decision while keeping the total trial duration constant. Each of the 
four runs consisted of 24 trials (16 charity and donation, 8 charity only) split evenly among our 
four trial types, for a total of 96 trials for analysis. Trial types were pseudorandomized to allow 
equal numbers of trial types to follow one another. Inter-trial intervals (ITIs) were jittered 
between 0 and 8000 msec (mean = 1750 msec, sampled from an exponential distribution).  
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Figure 4.1 Charitable donation task design. On 2/3 of trials the charity description was 
shown, followed by a screen showing the finger-response mappings, number of tokens 
earned, and requested a donation response. On the other 1/3 of trials the charity 
description was shown as before but the donation slide was replaced with a visual fixation 
slide. After all trials there was a 500 ms visual fixation and then the inter-trial interval. 
 
 
Charities were modeled after a previous behavioral study (Vickers & Preston, in prep) by 
varying the framing to emphasize the nurturant vs. heroic aspect and the passive vs. active 
aspect. This format allowed us to control for each type of victim and aid (e.g., helping capsized 
boaters) while varying our dimensions of interest. For example, if the victims were capsized 
boaters, the four frames could be Coast Guard teams jumping into the water (heroic-active), 
administering warming and rehydration treatments (nurturant-active), designing harnesses for the 
Coast Guard teams (heroic-passive), or funding charities supplying blankets and dehydration 
treatments to the Coast Guard (nurturant-passive).  
During charity portions of the trial, subjects were instructed to read and pay attention to 
the charity on the screen for 5500 msec, which was followed by 500 msec of visual fixation. 
After 2/3 of the trials in each run, subjects were then shown the number of tokens they “earned” 
and given a chance to donate. In order to increase task motivation, subjects were told they earned 
tokens based on their neural activity in response to the charity slides, but in reality token 
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amounts were random odd numbers between 5 and 9 pulled from a uniform distribution. Button-
response mappings were displayed on the screen during donation trials—participants pressed 
their left pinky for donations of 0 tokens and their right pinky to donate 9 tokens, with each 
finger in between increasing the donation by one token. Participants were not allowed to donate 
more tokens than they earned on that trial, the amount donated was shown on the screen after a 
response was given, and earned tokens were equated between subjects. Tokens did not carry over 
from trial to trial (i.e., on each trial, non-donated tokens are added to a bank of saved tokens, but 
participants could not donate banked tokens). Subjects were allowed 3500 msec to donate, 
followed by 500 msec fixation and then the ITI. On charity only trials, the donation screen was 
filled with an equivalent fixation time. 
In all trials, the fixation cursor changed colors from black to green at the trial onset with 
the charity description. The fixation cursor changed from green back to black 500 msec after the 
charity offset to signal that the they should make a donation response (charity viewing and 
donation trials) or that the task was over (charity only trials).  
Motor tapping localizer. To localize primary motor regions of the brain, subjects were 
cued to either “tap fast” or “rest.” During tapping blocks, subjects pressed with their left and 
right index fingers to the beat of a changing cursor for 20 seconds. During rest blocks, subjects 
relaxed for 20 seconds. Blocks of tapping and rest were repeated three times in the run. 
Grabbing visualization localizer. In order to isolate areas of the brain involved in more 
complex motor procedures, 15 images of objects were pulled from the International Affective 
Picture System database (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008). Images included objects such as 
books, dinnerware, and tools. At the beginning of each image block, a two-second cue at the top 
of the screen told participants to either “GRAB” or “WATCH” the images. The cue remained on 
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the screen while five images were presented for four seconds each. During grab blocks, subjects 
visualized reaching out, grabbing the image with both hands, and bringing it toward them. 
During watch blocks, subjects watched images on the screen passively without any visualization. 
Each block type was presented three times and blocks alternated between grab and watch blocks 
(first block counterbalanced between subjects). Twenty-second rest periods were given between 
each block. 
Nurturance localizer. Thirty images were pulled to isolate areas involved in responses 
to infants compared to adults to localize areas associated with the MCMA. Prior work has shown 
that “baby schema” activate the NAcc (Glocker et al., 2009) and that viewing baby faces activate 
the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; Kringelbach et al., 2008). Additionally, first-time mothers activate 
many areas of the MCMA in response to their own infants including the VTA, striatum medial 
PFC, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and dorsolateral PFC (Glocker et al., 2009; Strathearn, Li, 
Fonagy, & Montague, 2008). Fifteen babies and 15 adults (half female) were displayed 
separately in 20-second blocks, with each image presented for four seconds. Subjects were 
instructed to watch the images on the screen. As in the grabbing localizer, each block type was 
presented three times in an alternating sequential order (first block counterbalanced between 
subjects) with 20-second rest periods between each block. 
Charity ratings and personality questionnaires. After exiting the scanner, subjects 
rated charities and filled out personality questionnaires in a waiting area. They rated each charity 
on 7-point scales reflecting its (1) importance to society (1 = Very unimportant, 7 = Very 
important), (2) importance to them personally (1 = Very unimportant, 7 = Very important), (3) 
extent that feelings associated with nurturant vs. heroic actions were elicited (1 = Moved, 
touched, softhearted; 7 = Alarmed, activated, vigilant), and (4) level of physicality or energy 
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involved in the activity as a proxy for passive vs. active (1 = Very low, 7 = Very high). 
Personality questionnaires included the 30-item Penner Prosocial Battery (Penner, Fritzsche, 
Craiger, & Freifeld, 1995) to assess individual differences in empathy and Happiness Spending 
Inventory (Dunn, Aknin, & Norton, 2008) to assess difference in how much people enjoy 
spending on others. Multiple scales assessed the degree to which people prioritize careful 
thinking compared to jumping into action (Locomotion Assessment Scale; Kruglanski et al., 
2000), intuition (Preference for Intuition and Deliberation Scale; Betsch, 2004), and not liking to 
think (Need for Cognition Inventory; Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996) in case 
overthinking diminished the effects of charity framing on donations.  
Data acquisition. Visual stimuli were presented using E-Prime 2.0 software onto a 
screen at the back of the bore of the magnet that participants viewed through a mirror. Imaging 
data were acquired using a 3.0 T GE Signa scanner with the standard head coil. To measure the 
blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) signal for each participant in the main task, we acquired 
684 functional T2* weighted spiral in/out BOLD fMRI for increased signal to noise ratio (SNR) 
volumes (slice thickness = 4 mm, 29 slices, repetition time [TR] = 2000 msec, echo time [TE] = 
1700 msec, flip angle [FA] = 30°, in plane resolution = 3.44 x 3.44 mm) divided evenly across 
four runs. Localizer tasks for motor tapping, grabbing visualization, and nurturance were 
acquired with the same parameters but with 78, 150, 125 volumes respectively. Data was not 
collected until after the first 5 functional images to allow for steady state magnetization. 
Structural images for data presentation and co-registration were acquired in the same slice 
locations using a T1-weighted fast gradient echo pulse sequence (TE/FA = 30ms/90 degrees, in 
plane resolution = 0.859 x 0.859 mm), and high resolution structural images (voxel size 1 x 1 x 1 
mm) were collected using a T1-weighted, spoiled 3D GRE acquisition.  
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Analysis of BOLD Activation 
Preprocessing. Functional data were preprocessed and analyzed according to the general 
linear model with Statistical Parametric Mapping 8. The four runs of the charity task were 
spatially realigned to compensate for head-movements, “time-sliced” using sinc-interpolation to 
compensate for time-lag between subsequent slices, spatially normalized to the Talairach and 
Tournoux Atlas, and spatially smoothed using a Gaussian filter of 5.0-mm full-width half-
maximum to reduce spatial noise and to compensate for anatomical differences among the 
subjects.  
fMRI analysis during charity donations task. After preprocessing, eight regressors 
were created to model task events: one regressor was included for each of the four trial types 
(passive-nurturant, passive-heroic, active-nurturant, active-heroic) during the charity viewing 
period, and another four regressors for each trial type were included during the donation period 
for Charity & Donation trials. Each regressor was modeled as a block with duration equal to the 
time it was displayed (Charity Viewing = 5.5 sec, Donation = 3.5 sec), and for each regressor the 
temporal derivative was included to model variance. Additional nuisance regressors were 
included for the intercept of the run (4 regressors), each of the translation and rotation head 
movement parameters (6 regressors per run), and two regressors of no interest for each of the 12 
omitted charities (described in more detail below). A random effects analysis was then 
performed in which the contrast images from all subjects for a given contrast were submitted to 
an ANOVA, and differences in the canonical contrasts presented (differences in the temporal 
derivative are not discussed). This is a population test where the significance values assigned to 
each voxel indicate the likelihood of its being activated in the whole population from which the 
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sample has been drawn. Whole-brain results are presented at p < .05 with a family-wise error 
correction for multiple comparisons. 
Continuous parametric ratings. To provide convergent evidence, an additional 
parametric analysis was conducted. Each of the passive vs. active and nurturant vs. heroic ratings 
were averaged across subjects to provide a composite score for each charity. Two regressors per 
run modeled the Charity period and Donation period. Additional parametric effects modeled the 
extent to which each charity was viewed as passive vs. active (centered) and nurturant vs. heroic 
(centered). Second-level analyses are conducted using the same process as the above model. 
Region of interest (ROI) analyses. The same ROI analyses were used for all analyses (i.e., for a 
priori charity classifications and continuous parametric analysis). Follow-up ROI analyses were 
conducted for both the 2x2 ANOVA and the model with continuous parametric ratings. Six ROIs 
were identified in a prior study of charitable donations (Moll et al., 2006). These six ROIs 
included the left DLPFC, left and right fusiform cortices, midbrain VTA, right superior temporal 
sulcus/angular gyrus (STS), and left and right striatum. Two additional ROIs were created from 
the grabbing visualization localizer, which was processed using the same method as above but 
with regressors for the grabbing, watching, and rest blocks. Comparing grabbing to watching 
produced two significant clusters at p = .05 FWE in the left parietal lobe (-42, -44, 50) and left 
premotor area (-24, -8, 56). Spheres were created at the center of each peak with a 13.0-mm 
radius, displayed in   
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Figure 4.2. All ROI analyses were Bonferroni corrected by the number of ROIs (as in 
Kwak, Müller, Bohnen, Dayalu, & Seidler, 2012) for an effective threshold of p = .0056 
uncorrected. Since these ROIs covered the majority of areas associated with the MCMA, no 
additional ROIs were created from the nurturant localizer. 
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Figure 4.2. Regions of interest used for the analysis of imaging data. Regions included the 
left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, left parietal cortex, left pre-motor cortex, right superior 
temporal sulcus, midbrain/VTA, left and right striatum, and left and right fusiform. 
Images are presented in radiological format (left side of the image is the right side of the 
brain).  
 
Results, 2x2 ANOVA 
Manipulation check 
Upon review of the data, multiple charities did not fit into their assigned categories so the 3 
charities in which participant ratings strayed furthest from the intended categorization were 
removed from each category, leaving 9 per category for analysis (see removed charities in red in   
  84 
Figure 4.3). active charities (M = 4.95, se = 0.11) were rated as more active than the 
passive charities (M = 3.82, se = 0.16), t(28) = -8.87, Mpassive-active = -1.13, 95% CI = (-1.39, -
0.87), p < .001, ηp2 = 0.73. Heroic charities (M = 4.32, se = 0.25) were rated as more heroic than 
the nurturant charities (M = 3.01, se = 0.13), t(28) = 5.14, Mheroic-nurturant = 1.31, 95% CI = (0.79, 
1.83), p < .001, ηp2 = 0.49.  
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Figure 4.3. Scatterplot of mean-centered charity ratings on the passive vs. active ratings (x-
axis) and nurturant vs. heroic ratings (y-axis). More negative numbers represent more 
passive and nurturant charities, and more positive numbers represent more active and 
heroic charities. Charity types are colored, and charities that have been circled in red were 
removed from analysis. 
  
Donations 
Donations were analyzed using the percent of total tokens donated to each type of 
charity. Overall, subjects donated marginally more to nurturant than heroic charities, F(1,28) = 
3.73, p = .064, ηp2 = 0.12. There was no effect of passive compared to active charities, nor was 
there an interaction between passive vs. active and nurturant vs. heroic charities, Fs(1,28) < 1.50, 
ps < .20. When including gender in the overall model, all statistics remained at the same levels of 
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significance. There were no differences in reaction times between any charity types or gender so 
they are not discussed further. 
BOLD Activation During Charity Donations Task 
Using the 2x2 ANOVA, whole-brain effects were found in both the Charity and Donation 
period in the right anterior insula, dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), bilateral parietal 
cortex, right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), left inferior temporal gyrus, and primary 
visual cortex for all conditions contrasted against rest. In the Charity period there were also 
effects in the left anterior insula, bilateral premotor area, cerebellum, and right somatosensory 
cortex for all charity framings versus rest. The Donation period had unique activity in the left 
fusiform face area, right VLPFC, left temporal pole, thalamus, posterior cingulate, medial OFC, 
hypothalamus, and primary motor cortex for all charity framings versus rest (Table 4.1). No 
effects of charity type were found at the .05 FWE level. 
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Table 4.1. Whole-brain results for charity and donation period greater than rest. All effects 
are significant at a p < .05 with family-wise error correction. 
  
Cluster Peak    
Period Area pFWE Voxels pFWE punc x y z 
Charity R Anterior Insula < .001 397 < .001 < .001 34 26 -4 
 DMPFC < .001 3189 < .001 < .001 10 24 40 
    < .001 < .001 -4 14 46 
 L Premotor   < .001 < .001 -42 -2 58 
 Posterior Cerebellum < .001 1666 < .001 < .001 -16 -92 -20 
 Posterior Occipital  < .001 < .001 -6 -98 -10 
    < .001 < .001 18 -94 -10 
 L Anterior Insula < .001 349 < .001 < .001 -32 24 -4 
 R Premotor < .001 668 < .001 < .001 36 -12 60 
    < .001 < .001 34 -4 60 
    0.020 < .001 46 6 50 
 L Parietal Lobule < .001 541 < .001 < .001 -30 -58 46 
 R Parietal Lobule < .001 374 < .001 < .001 34 -54 50 
    0.001 < .001 26 -64 50 
 L Fronto-Parietal 
Junction 
0.002 72 0.003 < .001 -44 -34 42 
 R DLPFC < .001 122 0.003 < .001 52 30 30 
 R Primary 
Somatosensory 
0.005 41 0.005 < .001 46 -26 46 
 R DLPFC 0.005 42 0.012 < .001 46 8 28 
 L Posterior Inferior 
Temporal Gyrus 
0.010 24 0.016 < .001 -58 -44 0 
 Posterolateral Occipital 0.014 17 0.022 < .001 -30 -98 0 
Donation R Parietal < .001 3942 < .001 < .001 48 -40 58 
    < .001 < .001 38 -60 48 
    < .001 < .001 12 -74 56 
 R Posterior Occipital < .001 8454 < .001 < .001 22 -86 -16 
    < .001 < .001 -38 -84 -18 
 L Fusiform   < .001 < .001 50 -62 -18 
 DMPFC < .001 6372 < .001 < .001 14 28 54 
    < .001 < .001 -4 36 34 
    < .001 < .001 -8 20 56 
 L Parietal < .001 2348 < .001 < .001 -50 -36 56 
    < .001 < .001 -30 -64 56 
    < .001 < .001 -34 -64 48 
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Cluster Peak    
Period Area pFWE Voxels pFWE punc x y z 
 R Anterior Insula < .001 2919 < .001 < .001 42 20 -12 
 R DLPFC   < .001 < .001 48 34 22 
 R VLPFC   < .001 < .001 44 50 -8 
 L Temporal Pole < .001 1058 < .001 < .001 -48 18 -16 
 L VLPFC   < .001 < .001 -44 46 -10 
    < .001 < .001 -44 26 -10 
 L Premotor < .001 998 < .001 < .001 -38 16 50 
    < .001 < .001 -54 16 32 
 R Posterior Thalamus < .001 145 < .001 < .001 26 -28 2 
 R Posterior Inferior 
Temporal Gyrus 
0.005 45 < .001 < .001 62 -34 -16 
 R Thalamus < .001 143 0.001 < .001 16 -10 6 
 L Inferior Temporal 
Gyrus 
0.001 100 0.001 < .001 -62 -28 -16 
    0.003 < .001 -60 -18 -20 
    0.045 < .001 -60 -42 -14 
 Posterior Cingulate < .001 149 0.001 < .001 0 -22 32 
 Medial OFC 0.018 13 0.004 < .001 2 34 -20 
 L Thalamus 0.008 32 0.010 < .001 -12 -6 4 
 Hypothalamus 0.024 8 0.016 < .001 2 -10 -12 
 Paracentral Lobule 0.023 9 0.018 < .001 0 -28 74 
 L Primary Motor 0.037 2 0.034 < .001 -46 0 -26 
 R Occipital 0.032 4 0.046 < .001 30 -80 20 
 L Posterior Thalamus 0.042 1 0.049 < .001 -24 -30 2 
 
ROI analysis. During the Charity Period but not the donation period, the midbrain VTA 
and left DLPFC ROIs were activated by heroic charities. During the Charity period, heroic 
charities also activated the right fusiform, right STS, and left parietal ROIs more than nurturant 
charities, but all of these effects were qualified by an interaction between heroic/nurturant and 
passive/active charities (interaction effects in Figure 4.4). This interaction also showed up in the 
left fusiform and left premotor ROIs, and all effects were due to the same charity types. Across 
all ROIs the passive-heroic charities were associated with more activation than the passive-
nurturant charities. Additionally, the passive-nurturant charities were associated with lower 
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activation than both active charity types in both fusiform ROIs and in the STS. Passive-nurturant 
charities had lower activation than active-nurturant charities in the parietal ROI. 
During the Donation period, nurturant charities were associated with higher activation in 
the left parietal ROI, and heroic charities were associated with more activation in the left 
premotor ROI. No interactions reached significance during the Donation period for the ROI 
analysis. All effects are displayed in  
Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2. Results from the region of interest analysis in the 2x2 ANOVA. All effects 
Bonferroni corrected by the nine regions of interest. 
Period Contrast ROI t z p x y z 
Charity Active > Passive  STS R 2.75 2.65 0.004 28 -72 38 
 
Nurturant > Heroic DLPFC L 2.83 2.72 0.003 -48 2 36 
   
2.71 2.61 0.004 -42 -4 40 
  
Fusiform R 3.12 2.99 0.001 24 -78 -16 
  
Midbrain 
VTA 
3.25 3.10 0.001 6 -12 4 
  
STS R 2.75 2.65 0.004 32 -68 32 
  
Parietal 3.65 3.44 < .001 -52 -48 44 
 
Interaction Fusiform L 2.80 2.70 0.004 -22 -78 -18 
  
Fusiform R 3.45 3.27 0.001 24 -78 -10 
  
STS R 2.90 2.78 0.003 26 -70 38 
   
2.84 2.73 0.003 26 -72 34 
  
Parietal 3.61 3.41 < .001 -42 -48 60 
   
3.09 2.96 0.002 -48 -42 48 
  
Premotor 2.74 2.64 0.004 -26 -10 44 
Donation Nurturant > Heroic Parietal 3.04 2.91 0.002 -50 -48 44 
 
Heroic > Nurturant Premotor 2.67 2.58 0.005 -28 -14 46 
 
  
  
9
0
 
Figure 4.4. Contrast estimates of fMRI interaction effects during the Charity period in the 2x2 ANOVA. Gray bars represent 
estimates for passive charities and red bars represent active charities. Error bars represent one standard error of the mean. 
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Gender differences in charity donation task. The follow-up model tested whether there 
were any gender differences in the 2x2 ANOVA. During the Charity period, males showed 
stronger activation to passive charities than females in the midbrain VTA ROI, p = .001, (x,y,z) 
= (10, -2, -8), but there was no difference in activation for active charities. There were also two 
gender interactions with the passive vs. active by nurturant vs. heroic interaction in two ROIs, ps 
< .003 (premotor x,y,z = -16, -10, 52; striatum x,y,z = 16, -6, 18). The premotor effect during the 
Charity period and striatum effect during that donation period were driven by females having 
more activation in response to heroic-passive and active-nurturant charities than males, plotted in 
Figure 4.6.  
Regressors for Percent Donated. To investigate whether any of the effects were 
correlated with the percent of tokens that participants donated, the 2x2 ANOVA was fit with 
additional regressors for the percent donated to each charity type. During the charity period, 
increased activation in the left and right striatum and parietal ROIs were associated with more 
donations to heroic charities, ts > 2.90, ps < .002, but activation in these areas was not reliably 
associated with donations to nurturant charities. In the premotor ROI, increased activation was 
associated with lower donation to heroic charities, and higher donations to nurturant charities, t = 
3.26, p = .001. During the Donation period, activation in the left fusiform was associated with 
decreased donations to both nurturant and heroic charities, and the effect was stronger for heroic 
than nurturant charities, ts > 2.60, ps < .005. The fact that activation toward heroic charities in 
the premotor and fusiform cortices is in-line with the idea that preparing for and visualizing 
heroic actions more may overwhelm subjects and lead to decreased donations. A slight positive 
effect was found in the right fusiform, but only in a single voxel so we do not explore it. All 
results are plotted in Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5. Regions of interest that predict differences in the percent of tokens donated to 
nurturant and heroic charities in the 2x2 ANOVA. Error bars indicate one standard error 
of the mean. 
  
 
Results, Parametric Ratings Analysis 
Donations 
Analysis of donations using the mean ratings on the passive vs. active and nurturant vs. 
heroic scales was done using a linear mixed model to estimate effects of individual charities at 
the group level. Ratings for each charity were averaged across subjects on the passive vs. active 
scale and nurturant vs. heroic scale, and the one to seven ratings were mean-centered for 
statistics. We also used individual subjects’ ratings in statistics (i.e., not collapsing charity 
ratings across subjects) and results remained very similar, but due to lower variability they are 
not presented here. 
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Figure 4.6. Contrast estimates for gender differences in the 2x2 ANOVA by region of interest (ROI). The period and ROI are 
displayed on the top, with blue bars showing effects for males and red bars showing effects for females. Error bars represent 
one standard error of the mean. 
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Subjects donated 2.4% more tokens as charities became one unit more active, β = 2.42, se 
= 0.53, t = 4.53, p < .001, and donated 5.9% more as charities became one unit more nurturant, β 
= -5.91, se = 0.69, t = -8.58, p < .001. These effects were qualified by an interaction between the 
two rating scales. The slope of the passive vs. active effect in more nurturant charities was higher 
than the slope for more heroic charities, β = -3.05, se = 0.69, t = -4.45, p < .001. In other words, 
for charities that were lower than the mean on the nurturant vs. heroic scale, the slope of the 
passive vs. active ratings on donations was positive and significant, β = 5.39, t = 6.22, p < .001, 
but the slope was negative and not significantly different from zero for charities that were higher 
than the mean on the nurturant vs. heroic scale, β = -0.60, t = -0.89, p = .374, see Figure 4.7. 
Figure 4.7. Interaction between nurturant vs. heroic and passive vs. active ratings on 
donations. For the most nurturant charities, participants donated more as charities became 
more active. For the most heroic charities, how passive vs. active the charity was did not 
influence donations. 
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When including gender in the model, the effect of passive vs. active ratings remained 
positive and significant, β = 1.03, t = 3.18, p < .001. The overall effect of nurturant vs. heroic 
ratings fell to a non-significant level, χ(1)2 = 0.02, p = .879, but this omnibus effect was qualified 
by an interaction between nurturant vs. heroic ratings and gender, χ(1)2 = 12.12, p < .001. Both 
males and females donated significantly more as charities were rated as more nurturant, but this 
effect was significantly larger in males, males: β = -8.61, t = -8.84; females: β = -3.22, t = -3.32. 
The interaction between passive vs. active and nurturant vs. heroic ratings fell to a marginal level 
of significance, χ(1)2 = 3.72, β = 0.33, t = 2.18, p = .054.  
BOLD Activation to Parametric Regressors 
With the regressors for passive vs. active and nurturant vs. heroic ratings, most effects 
were found during that Charity portion of the task. During the Charity period, the positive linear 
effect of active over passive ratings was associated with higher BOLD signal midbrain VTA 
ROI. There was also a linear effect of active > passive ratings in the left DLPFC, left striatum, 
right STS, and left premotor ROIs, ts > 2.60, ps < .005, but these were all qualified by an 
interaction with the nurturant vs. heroic ratings, ts > 2.80, ps < .004. For all of these interactions 
there was a higher BOLD signal for active and nurturant charities compared to passive and 
heroic charities. During the donation period, BOLD signal in the right STS increased as charities 
were rated as more active, t = 3.12, p = .001. Both the STS and parietal ROIs showed the same 
interaction as the prior ones, ts > 2.60, ps < .005, with BOLD activation increasing more for 
active and nurturant charities compared to passive and heroic ones, plotted in Figure 4.8.  
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Table 4.3. Results of the region of interest analysis based on parametric effects on the 
passive vs. active and nurturant vs. heroic ratings scales. All effects surpass the Bonferroni 
corrected threshold. 
Period Contrast ROI t z p x y z 
Charity Active > 
Passive 
DLPFC L 3.40 3.23 0.001 -48 6 44 
  
3.36 3.19 0.001 -38 -2 44 
   
3.15 3.01 0.001 -30 4 34 
   
2.80 2.69 0.004 -46 14 28 
   
2.69 2.59 0.005 -38 2 24 
   
2.69 2.59 0.005 -34 4 24 
  
Midbrain VTA 3.02 2.89 0.002 4 -18 -2 
   
2.96 2.84 0.002 2 -24 -6 
  
STS R 2.89 2.77 0.003 40 -52 36 
   
2.70 2.61 0.005 32 -68 32 
   
2.64 2.56 0.005 38 -74 30 
  
Striatum L 3.13 2.99 0.001 -6 10 18 
  
Premotor L 3.26 3.11 0.001 -34 0 56 
   
3.19 3.04 0.001 -36 -4 54 
   
2.63 2.54 0.006 -32 -2 48 
 
Nurturant > 
Heroic 
STS R 2.92 2.80 0.003 34 -52 38 
  
2.82 2.72 0.003 40 -56 42 
 
Act/Pas * 
Hero/Nurt 
DLPFC 3.14 3.00 0.001 -30 2 28 
  
3.01 2.89 0.002 -44 6 46 
   
2.90 2.78 0.003 -48 6 44 
  
Striatum L 3.64 3.44 < .001 -24 4 24 
  
STS R 3.05 2.92 0.002 36 -52 38 
  
Premotor 3.38 3.21 0.001 -34 0 58 
   
3.10 2.97 0.002 -32 0 50 
   
2.71 2.62 0.004 -26 4 60 
   
2.83 2.72 0.003 -22 -16 62 
Donation Active > 
Passive 
STS R 3.12 2.99 0.001 30 -54 26 
 
Premotor L 2.95 2.83 0.002 -30 -18 52 
   
2.88 2.77 0.003 -28 -18 62 
   
2.87 2.76 0.003 -28 -20 58 
 
Nurturant > 
Heroic Parietal L 
2.68 2.59 0.005 -34 -44 60 
 
Act/Pas * 
Hero/Nurt 
STS R 3.22 3.07 0.001 32 -56 24 
 
Parietal L 2.63 2.55 0.005 -36 -36 54 
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Figure 4.8. Contrast estimates for the interaction between passive vs. active and nurturant 
vs. heroic ratings. All interaction effects show higher BOLD signal in areas for active and 
nurturant charities compared to passive and heroic charities. Error bars represent one 
standard error of the mean. 
  
Gender differences in the parametric ratings analysis. When including gender in the 
model, the linear effect in the bilateral striatal ROIs led to higher activation as charities became 
more nurturant in females, but led to higher activation as charities became more heroic in males, 
ts > 2.50, ps < .005. During the Donation period, a similar effect was found in the parietal and 
premotor ROIs where females showed more activation with more nurturant charities but males 
showed more activation with more heroic charities, ts > 2.75, ps < .003. Additionally, the linear 
effect of active charities led to higher activation in the right STS in females but there was no 
effect in males, t = 3.00, p = .002, all plotted in Figure 4.9. None of the two-way interactions 
showed an additional interaction with gender at the Bonferroni corrected threshold. 
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Figure 4.9. Gender interactions in the parametric model comparing passive vs. active and 
nurturant vs. heroic ratings. Blue bars depict the effect in males and red bars depict the 
effect in females. Error bars represent one standard error of the mean. 
  
Discussion 
Overall, while we did not find evidence for differences in donations depending on our a 
priori charity types, we did find differences in neural activation to these charity types. The VTA 
was more active for heroic compared to nurturant charities, and many of the differences in neural 
activation were qualified by an interaction. Heroic-passive and nurturant-active charities led to 
higher activation in a range of areas, including the DLPFC, bilateral fusiform cortices, STS, 
parietal, and premotor ROIs. This was unexpected, and may be due to different underlying 
processes.  
All of the ROIs from Moll were taken from areas involved in reward and charitable 
donations. This suggests that nurturant charities that are framed in a more present, active sense 
may be processed in a more prosocial, rewarding way. This could be because they can imagine 
themselves helping the other without any fear of danger to themselves. However, the processing 
of heroic charities may be hindered when they are framed in a more present, active sense because 
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heroic-active helping tends to require motor expertise that subjects are not familiar with, and 
dangerous actions. If participants are putting themselves into the helper’s perspective in these 
situations it may actually backfire because it produces more activation along the aversive, fear-
related processing stream, leading to less robust activation of the charitable donation circuit. To 
test this we are recruiting additional subjects and investigating whether people who imagine 
themselves as the helper in heroic-active situations response with more negative, aversive 
feelings.  
While we did not hypothesize any specific gender differences in the ROIs, we did find a 
few. Interestingly, VTA, reward-related activation was associated with the hypothesized active 
charities in females but was associated with passive charities in males. The MCMA does not lay 
out specific gender differences, but the rodent retrieval responses that it is partially based on 
have been studied in the female dams, leading to the possibility that it is a gender-specific 
response. Supporting this idea, females showed increased brain activation in response to heroic-
passive and nurturant-active charities compared to males, who showed no differences in neural 
activation, even though they also rated the charities differently. Future research will need to 
follow-up on this to investigate whether the proposed MCMA is primarily functioning in females 
and may follow a different route in males, whether females and males evaluate charities based on 
different processes (e.g., imagining themselves as the helper or not), or whether females and 
males weight charity attributes differently.  
Since our a priori charities were not well differentiated on the passive vs. active and 
nurturant vs. heroic rating scales we ran additional analyses using parametric tests of effects. 
Behaviorally, effects of our prior work were replicated. Charities that were rated as more active 
received increased donations, and charities that were rated as more nurturant received increased 
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donations. Additionally, there was an interaction between ratings such that nurturant-active 
charities received the highest donations. These results were much more in line with our prior 
studies that showed large effects for active compared to passive charities. This analysis reflects 
how participants perceive the charities rather than the categories that we put them into, so if the 
MCMA neural activation is associated with perceived attributes of the charities then this analysis 
should produce neural differences that are more in line with the MCMA and our hypotheses. 
In line with prior studies that found activation of the VTA, striatum, and DLPFC in 
response to images of their own infants (Strathearn et al., 2008), active charities led to increased 
activation in the VTA, left striatum (and right striatum at lower thresholds), DLPFC, STS, and 
premotor area. This suggests that perceptions of the charities may map onto the MCMA 
hypotheses more directly than the a priori categories that we had classified charities into. Here 
we also found that many areas came online with the conjunction of active and nurturant 
charities—the same types of charities that received increased donations—including the left 
striatum, DLPFC, STS, and premotor area. It is notable that the VTA is the only area to come up 
as a main effect for active > passive ratings but not also nurturant > heroic ratings. Since the 
VTA is hypothesized to be part of the approach processing stream it should be active for all 
charities that lead to increased helping (more active and more nurturant), but it is a small 
structure that may be difficult to get a strong signal from using fMRI. Future research would 
benefit form further probing of the VTA compared to other effects and determine whether the 
VTA is more responsive to active than nurturant charities, or is more responsive to nurturant-
active charities like the other areas.  
There were fewer differences in the parametric model, but again they were driven by 
females showing stronger responses than males. Females showed stronger responses bilaterally 
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in the striatum, in the parietal ROI, and in the premotor area compared to males for nurturant 
charities. Additionally, females showed a stronger response in the STS to active charities 
compared to males. In the ratings, females rated the passive charities as more active compared to 
males, and the heroic charities as more nurturant compared to males. This suggests that females 
may be paying more attention to the active and nurturant aspects of charities compared to the 
males, which may also be why they are showing the increased activation. In order to test whether 
these differences are due to gendered processing of the charities, a follow-up study should have 
people focus on active-nurturant or passive-heroic aspects of the charities. If the differences are 
indeed due to attention allocation, the active-nurturant condition should lead to higher donations 
than the passive-heroic condition, whereas if they are due to gendered processing then we should 
again find that females are showing stronger activation across both conditions compared to the 
males. 
Conclusion 
This study builds upon the Maternal Caregiving Model of Altruism and prior work in our 
lab suggesting that active and nurturant charities elicit stronger donations than passive and heroic 
charities. While our initial analysis based on a priori charity types failed to find the hypothesized 
differences, using subjects’ perceptions of the charities provided a much better fit with the 
MCMA. In line with the hypothesis that the Maternal Caregiving circuit is involved in helping 
behaviors, areas that are activated in response to pictures of infants (e.g., VTA, striatum, 
DLPFC) were brought online during charitable donations, and they were especially brought 
online in response to active and nurturant charities that were hypothesized to activate the 
Maternal Caregiving circuit the most. While this provides preliminary evidence that maternal 
caregiving circuits subserve some processing when making donation decisions, much work still 
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needs to be accomplished to help us understand how people make prosocial, charitable donations 
to others in need. 
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Appendix 4A. Gender Differences in BOLD Activation 
 
Table 4.4. Gender differences in the region of interest analysis with parametric effects on 
the passive vs. active and nurturant vs. heroic scales. All effects surpass the Bonferroni 
corrected threshold. 
Period Contrast ROI t z p x y z 
Charity Heroic > Nurturant  
  by Gender 
Striatum L 3.00 2.87 0.002 -6 0 20 
  Striatum R 2.68 2.59 0.005 6 0 16 
Donation Active > Passive  
  by Gender 
STS R 3.24 3.08 0.001 38 -58 26 
   3.00 2.87 0.002 38 -70 32 
 Heroic > Nurturant  
  by Gender 
Parietal L 2.96 2.84 0.002 -44 -32 54 
  Premotor L 2.89 2.78 0.003 -36 -10 60 
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Chapter 5: General Discussion 
Despite lean resources and self-professed desires to be sustainable and consume less, 
people still acquire and consume beyond their needs. These actions are partly subserved by 
transient and chronic affective states as well as differences in people’s perceptions of options. 
This dissertation presented three studies that examined factors influencing people’s resource 
allocation decisions using both specific emotions and predictions derived form their underlying 
appraisal dimensions. Together, this work suggests that uncertainty, anxiety, arousal, and sadness 
are all associated with resource allocation decisions. 
What differentiates this work is the approach using appraisal theory, both with discrete 
emotions and with specific appraisal dimensions, to look at both acquisition- and discard-related 
phenomena. While the new focus of research linking emotions and decision making is 
investigating specific emotions, less research has shown strong evidence that any specific 
appraisal dimension is leading to the decision outcomes. Separating effects of appraisals from 
emotions themselves is extremely difficult using paradigms that manipulate emotions 
individually. Many of these studies have been effective at advancing our understanding and the 
field, but whether the results are due to a single appraisal dimension, multiple appraisal 
dimensions, or the interaction of appraisal dimensions is unclear.  
One of the earliest and most robust effects of emotions on decision making has been of 
anger and fear on choices associated with risk and uncertainty. Anger is a high certainty, high 
individual control emotion whereas fear is a low certainty, low individual control emotion (Smith 
& Ellsworth, 1985). In one study (Lerner, 2001), angry people had more optimistic risk 
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assessments and were more risk-seeking than fearful people, and these effects were mediated by 
appraisals of individual control but not certainty. In another study comparing anger to sadness, 
angry people thought that ambiguous events were more likely to be caused by people, but there 
was no difference between the sadness and anger groups for non-ambiguous events (Keltner et 
al., 1993). In this article, the authors proposed that anger influenced choice because anger is 
associated with “perceptions of other people as responsible for one’s misfortune.” This draws 
upon the same appraisal dimension as the first study, individual responsibility. Because the same 
appraisal dimension is proposed to be the cause of both results, manipulating individual 
responsibility on its own should lead to differences in both risk preferences appraisals of events 
happening. However, this has not been done, and this approach of manipulating appraisal 
dimensions individually is seldom undertaken. 
One published study took this approach and manipulated appraisal dimensions within a 
specific emotion, varying levels of certainty within sadness (Tiedens & Linton, 2001). The 
authors were interested in how different types of persuasive messages were received. Across 
multiple emotions, people who were experiencing certain emotions interpreted messages with a 
heuristic processing style compared to people who were experiencing uncertain emotions, who 
interpreted messages in a systematic processing style. In the final study, they varied the level of 
certainty within sadness and replicated the prior findings, providing convergent evidence that 
uncertainty itself was leading to differences in message processing. In Chapter 2, we found that 
anxiety, a low-certainty emotion, increased acquisitiveness. Due to its lower certainty than 
sadness, we manipulated certainty within sadness to investigate whether low-certainty sadness 
would lead to similar increases in acquisitiveness. Indeed, low-certainty sadness did lead to 
increases in consumption, but this was not the whole story. When subjects were a combination of 
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uncertain and sad they did not increase their acquisition rates. These interactive effects have not 
been demonstrated before and theoretically could be due to one of two reasons.  
According to appraisal theories of emotion, there are varying appraisal dimensions with 
different prototypical emotions existing at different points along each of the dimensions (Scherer 
et al., 2001; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). In this sense, reporting multiple dimensions suggest that 
subjects are closer across those dimensions. Considering that sadness and anxiety primarily 
differ on the appraisal dimensions of certainty and arousal, this suggests that one of these 
dimensions is causing decreased acquisitiveness. We found a similar effect in the patient sample 
presented in Chapter 3. Subjects with higher levels of depression and uncertainty were 
disinterested in scrap items that are low-value but could be used in many different ways. It is 
important to also note that in both of these studies participants reported feeling more emotions 
overall. The participants in Chapter 2 reported feeling both sadness and anxiety, and the patients 
in Chapter 3 reported feeling a variety of affective and other problems, including loss of interest 
in activities they enjoy, depression, worry, anxiety sensitivity, and emotional lability. While 
appraisal theories predict that the combination of emotions reduces acquisitiveness because 
people are moving to more certain affective states, there is an alternate possibility that higher 
numbers of negative emotions in and of themselves decrease acquisitiveness. 
The hypothesis that higher levels of negative emotions can lead to debilitating outcomes 
has been suggested previously. Izard (1972), building on the work of Tomkins (Tomkins, 1963; 
Tomkins, 1962), wrote extensively on what he described as patterns of emotions, combinations 
of specific emotions that co-occur in regular patterns and have unique motivational-experiential 
characteristics. He proposed that affective disorders are composed of a number of specific 
affective states at the same time. In his framework, anxiety is composed of interest, low anger, 
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low contempt, and fear, whereas depression is composed of low interest, distress, anger, disgust, 
and contempt. In some of my other work, we have found that higher levels of negative states are 
associated with higher intensity affect and higher distress (Vickers, Carpenter, & Ellsworth, in 
prep), but we do not know whether they would lead to similar decreases in behavioral outcomes. 
Future research could follow up on this by using robust effects (e.g., anger and fear on risk 
attitudes) and seeing whether emotions produce effects in a U-shaped pattern, such that 
participants feeling moderate levels of fear are risk-averse but those feeling extreme levels of 
fear and other emotions are not as risk averse.  
The appraisal framework can also help understand the effects of charitable donations in 
Chapter 4. Drawing upon the typical emotions that subjects experience in empathy tasks (Batson 
et al., 1987; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990; Preston & Hofelich, 2012), empathic concern is 
associated with a suite of positive emotions such as feeling sympathetic, softhearted, warm, 
compassionate, and tender toward the other. Personal distress, on the other hand, is associated 
with a suite of negative emotions such as feeling grieved, troubled, distressed, upset, and 
worried. In the donations task (Chapter 4), the nurturant charities made participants feel more 
“moved, touched, and softhearted,” emotions that are all much more aligned to empathic concern 
than personal distress.  
Applying the appraisal tendencies framework suggests that when people experience 
higher arousal levels of empathic concern they are more likely and take action to help another 
person. Since these are integral emotions to the decision, this makes sense. Indeed, when people 
feel stronger empathic concern for targets they are more likely to help (Batson, Ahmad, Lishner, 
& Tsang, 2002), and when people are more likely to feel empathic concern on a day-to-day basis 
they are also more likely to help others (Davis, 1983). In order to test whether higher-arousal 
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positive emotions lead to increased helping we need to first identify a low-arousal positive 
emotion and relevant higher-arousal comparisons: contentment is lower arousal compared to 
happiness and pride. If higher arousal positive emotions lead to an increased likelihood of 
helping others then happiness should lead to more donations than contentment. This could easily 
be tested via emotion inductions, recording baseline emotions, or making content people higher 
in arousal through arousal manipulations (e.g., Vickers & Preston, in prep). The feelings elicited 
by heroic charities did not map onto specific emotions as well as those from nurturant charities. 
Heroic charities made people feel more “alarmed, activated, and vigilant.” We have a working 
hypothesis that males imagine themselves in the shoes of the helper more than females, and that 
this leads males to feel more personal distress in response to heroic charities that perform 
activities with high risk of personal harm. Confirmatory testing of this hypothesis is ongoing.  
To summarize, we found that appraisals, manipulated via specific emotions, appraisal 
dimensions within emotions, combinations of emotions, and framing can all lead to shifts in 
consumption decisions. Participants who felt negative and a high-arousal emotion, anxiety, 
acquired and consumed more. Conversely, participants feeling positive and high-arousal 
emotions, compassion and sympathy, gave away more of their resources to others. We have not 
explored this divergence between positive and negative emotions in consumption patterns, but 
understanding it is important in order to help people reduce their environmental impact and 
stresses associated with consumption. Since feelings of warmth and sympathy toward others 
leads to increases in charitable donations, it seems plausible that similar feelings toward the 
Salvation Army would make people more likely to donate their old objects so that others can 
reuse them. Examining this flip side of consumption regarding how people choose to donate and 
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help others, including the affective factors associated with them, is critical to achieve a better 
understanding of consumption and create a more sustainable world. 
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